CAJ | 학술논문

本文在理论分析的基础上，重新定义了内部人所有权，将其区分为“广义内部人所有权”和“狭义内部人所有权”，考察了其不同的委托代理问题。运用中国民营上市公司数据，发现企业价值与“广义内部人所有权”之间存在“u型”曲线关系，同时也验证了“狭义内部人所有权”与企业价值之间的“倒U型”曲线关系。结论表明，监督效应与侵占效应在中国民营上市公司中发挥作用，企业大股东易于勾结起来和高管形成串谋侵占小股东利益；堑壕效应与利益趋同效应在中国民营上市公司中同样发挥作用，但由于在中国，“狭义内部人所有权”普遍极低，现有数据难以给出完美的分析。
본문재이론분석적기출상，중신정의료내부인소유권，장기구분위“엄의내부인소유권”화“협의내부인소유권”，고찰료기불동적위탁대리문제。운용중국민영상시공사수거，발현기업개치여“엄의내부인소유권”지간존재“u형”곡선관계，동시야험증료“협의내부인소유권”여기업개치지간적“도U형”곡선관계。결론표명，감독효응여침점효응재중국민영상시공사중발휘작용，기업대고동역우구결기래화고관형성천모침점소고동이익；참호효응여이익추동효응재중국민영상시공사중동양발휘작용，단유우재중국，“협의내부인소유권”보편겁저，현유수거난이급출완미적분석。
On the basis of the theoretic analysis, this paper redefined insider ownership by classifying it into ＂insider ownership in broad sense＂ and ＂insider ownership in narrow sense＂, and examined their different principal-agent problems. With the data of the Chinese listed private firms, we found the curve relationship shaped like the letter ＂U＂ between Tobin＇s Q and ＂insider ownership in broad sense＂, also confirmed the curve relationship shaped like the symbol reverse ＂U＂ between Tobin＇s Q and ~＇ insider ownership in narrow sense＂. The conclusion indicated that the monitoring effects and the expropriation effects exert influence on the Chinese listed private firms, the large shareholders of the enterprise are easy to play booty and collude with top managers to expropriate the small shareholders＇ benefits; the entrenchment effects and the convergence-of-interest effects also exert influence an the Chinese listed private firms, but in China, ＂insider ownership in narrow sense＂is so low that the existing data is hard to give a perfect investigation.