CAJ | 학술논문

研究一个制造商与一个零售商组成的分销系统，制造商根据分销商的销售量提出一个可变回购契约，研究表明当制造商为供应链中的领导者时，制造商所采用的可变回收价格系数的Stackelberg模型的子博弈精炼Nash均衡解是他采用固定回收价格时的均衡解减去产品剩余价值的值，也就是制造商会通过可变回收价格系数来得到更多利润，为更有力的激励零售商销售产品，制造商应采用高于Stackelberg模型的子博弈精炼Nash均衡解的可变回收系数使得零售商提高订货量。
연구일개제조상여일개령수상조성적분소계통，제조상근거분소상적소수량제출일개가변회구계약，연구표명당제조상위공응련중적령도자시，제조상소채용적가변회수개격계수적Stackelberg모형적자박혁정련Nash균형해시타채용고정회수개격시적균형해감거산품잉여개치적치，야취시제조상회통과가변회수개격계수래득도경다리윤，위경유력적격려령수상소수산품，제조상응채용고우Stackelberg모형적자박혁정련Nash균형해적가변회수계수사득령수상제고정화량。
A study is made within a distribution system consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer in the supply chain management. The manufacturer provides a variable buy-back contract according to the sale of the retailer. This research reveals that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the variable price coefficient in the variable buy-back contract mechanism Stackelberg Model is equal to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium price in the fixed buy-back contract mechanism Stackelberg Model minus the salvage of the product. That is to say that the manufacturer can get more profit from the variable buy-back contract mechanism. To stimulate the retailer for getting more quantity, the manufacturer should provide a higher variable price coefficient than the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium variable price coefficient in the variable buy-back contract mechanism.