CAJ | 학술논문

控制权利益虽然在配股和增发中发挥着重要的作用，但本文研究发现，可转债债券属性的潜在约束和转换期权的不确定性对控制权利益起一定的抑制作用，控制权利益在上市公司可转债融资中不起主导作用。可转债债券属性对控制利益的潜在约束作用明显，我国可以适度发展可转债融资来抑制资本市场上较普遍的控制权利益。
공제권이익수연재배고화증발중발휘착중요적작용，단본문연구발현，가전채채권속성적잠재약속화전환기권적불학정성대공제권이익기일정적억제작용，공제권이익재상시공사가전채융자중불기주도작용。가전채채권속성대공제이익적잠재약속작용명현，아국가이괄도발전가전채융자래억제자본시장상교보편적공제권이익。
Private benefit control plays a major role in dividing shares and issuing additional shares. However, the study in this article shows that the potential restriction of convertible bond feature and the uncertainty of convertible option restrain the private benefit control and the private benefit control does not play a dominant role in financing via convertible debts by listed companies. Since the property of convertible bonds has a distinct constraint on private bonefit control, China can properly use financing via convertible debts to inhibit the universal private benefit control on capital market.