CAJ | 학술논문

针对医疗服务市场的特点，讨论了医药分业后政府补贴公立医院的利益补偿机制，以优化资源配置为目标建立医院与政府的信号博弈模型并进行均衡分析，发现市场的均衡效率随作假的伪装成本和期望风险成本减少而降低；实现市场完全成功的分离均衡的关键条件为保持较高伪装成本和期望风险成本；相应的政策应集中于建立医疗服务行业规范和提升医疗监察效率。
침대의료복무시장적특점，토론료의약분업후정부보첩공립의원적이익보상궤제，이우화자원배치위목표건립의원여정부적신호박혁모형병진행균형분석，발현시장적균형효솔수작가적위장성본화기망풍험성본감소이강저；실현시장완전성공적분리균형적관건조건위보지교고위장성본화기망풍험성본；상응적정책응집중우건립의료복무행업규범화제승의료감찰효솔。
From the characteristics of the Chinese health-care market, the reimbursement mechanism for public hospitals was discussed after the dispense was separated from Prescription （SDP） reform. Considering the optimal resource allocation, a signaling game model was used to balance between public hospitals and the government. According to the analysis of equilibrium between the two parties, it is found that the efficiency of separating equilibrium would decrease as the disguised cost and expected risk cost move downwards. In order to reach the completely successful separating equilibrium solution, the government should maintain the above two costs at high levels. It is pointed that relevant policies should focus on establishing association standard for the health-care industry as well as improving the supervision efficiency.