CAJ | 학술논문

本文从寻租角度分析了资本预算项目恶性增资的成因。出于对不同控制主体寻租动机和动力的考虑，本文将样本企业从终极控制人的角度区分为民营主体控制的企业和政府控制的企业，并将政府控制的企业进一步区分为中央政府控制的企业和地方政府控制的企业。研究发现，恶性增资现象发生的概率比较高，应该引起足够的重视；同时发现中央政府控制的企业比地方政府控制的企业恶性增资发生概率低，但是没有发现民营主体控制的企业比政府控制的企业恶性增资发生的概率低。
본문종심조각도분석료자본예산항목악성증자적성인。출우대불동공제주체심조동궤화동력적고필，본문장양본기업종종겁공제인적각도구분위민영주체공제적기업화정부공제적기업，병장정부공제적기업진일보구분위중앙정부공제적기업화지방정부공제적기업。연구발현，악성증자현상발생적개솔비교고，응해인기족구적중시；동시발현중앙정부공제적기업비지방정부공제적기업악성증자발생개솔저，단시몰유발현민영주체공제적기업비정부공제적기업악성증자발생적개솔저。
The paper examines the escalating commitment in capital budget items from the perspective of rent-seeking behavior. Out of different motives and driving forces of different rent-seeking body for consideration, this article samples enterprises from the perspective of the terminal control body into private enterprises and government-controlled enterprises, and government-controlled enterprises to further divided into enterprises controlled by central government and enterprises controlled by local governments. Our study finds that the probability of escalating commitment is relatively high, should attract enough attention. At the same time, we find the probability of escalating commitment is relatively low in enterprises controlled by central government over enterprises controlled by local government, but do not find the probability of escalating commitment is relatively low in private enterprises over enterprises controlled by government.