CAJ | 학술논문

基于单一制造商与单一零售商所组成的渠道结构，放宽了市场需求为确定性的假设，引入了存货因子这一决策变量，先后考察了Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈时制造商与零售商的最优广告策略及零售商的最优存货策略，比较了不同博弈结构下的均衡策略及相应期望利润，并利用Nash讨价还价模型对合作利润进行了分配。通过一个数学算例验证了有关结论。
기우단일제조상여단일령수상소조성적거도결구，방관료시장수구위학정성적가설，인입료존화인자저일결책변량，선후고찰료Stackelberg주종박혁화Nash합작박혁시제조상여령수상적최우엄고책략급령수상적최우존화책략，비교료불동박혁결구하적균형책략급상응기망리윤，병이용Nash토개환개모형대합작리윤진행료분배。통과일개수학산례험증료유관결론。
For marketing channels consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper relaxes the control that market demands are certain, uses a decision variable of stocking factor, investigates the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇ s optimal advertising strategies and the retailer＇ s optimal stocking strategies when Stackelberg leader-follower game and Nash cooperative game are played. Equilibrium strategies and correspondent profits are compared between the two games. Nash bargaining model is employed to divide cooperative profits.