CAJ | 학술논문

基于资本投资形成控制权收益的理论阐释，结合我国上市公司大股东攫取控制权收益的自利动机和市场风险分析．本文以2001-2005年沪深两市A股市场发生了非流通股交易的公司作为考察对象，从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面对大股东的控制权收益攫取进行了实证研究，并进行了稳健性检验。研究发现，大股东不仅通过资本投资形成了控制权收益，而且资本投资规模越高，增加等量资本投资所攫取的控制权收益越低；尽管通过股权投资攫取控制权收益的隐秘性较高、成本较低，但由于增加了控制链的代理层级，控制性股东的收益占有程度也较低；大股东的自利性资本投资行为不仅挤占了中小投资者的共享利益，而且形成了从增加资本投资、形成更高控制权收益到损害企业价值的传导机制。根据经验结论，本文提出了相应的政策建议。
기우자본투자형성공제권수익적이론천석，결합아국상시공사대고동확취공제권수익적자리동궤화시장풍험분석．본문이2001-2005년호심량시A고시장발생료비류통고교역적공사작위고찰대상，종고정자산투자화고권투자량개방면대대고동적공제권수익확취진행료실증연구，병진행료은건성검험。연구발현，대고동불부통과자본투자형성료공제권수익，이차자본투자규모월고，증가등량자본투자소확취적공제권수익월저；진관통과고권투자확취공제권수익적은비성교고、성본교저，단유우증가료공제련적대리층급，공제성고동적수익점유정도야교저；대고동적자리성자본투자행위불부제점료중소투자자적공향이익，이차형성료종증가자본투자、형성경고공제권수익도손해기업개치적전도궤제。근거경험결론，본문제출료상응적정책건의。
Private benefits of control arise when cash flow rights do not coincide with control rights, a situation that occurs even in ＂one-share-one-vote＂ structures. Corporate decision makers＇ pursuit of private benefits of control reflects their selfishness and is an important reason for agency conflicts. Controlling shareholders are frequently accused of overinvestment in assets as a consequence of the private benefits they derive from controlling assets. Based on the above derivation of earning control benefits through capital investment, and combining owner equity structure and control rights allocation in Chinese listed companies, we study the behavior of controlling shareholders in obtaining benefits of control from two aspects; fixed capital investment and equity investment. The results indicate that：（1） controlling shareholders can obtain the benefits of control through capital investment, and the scale of capital investment is significantly and positively related to the level of benefit; （2） when capital control is increased, the higher the scale of capital investment, the fewer the benefits of control obtained; （3） compared to fixed capital investment, the cost of obtaining benefits of control through equity investment is lower, but the degree of benefit that controlling shareholders earn from merged corporations is lower; and （4） controlling shareholders＇ capital investment motivated by their self-interest can harm minority investors and damage corporation value. This research improves the current understanding of private benefits of control in Chinese listed companies, and gives a new perspective for under- standing the relationship between private benefits of control and capital investment. The conclusions of this paper also have some policy implications, including improving the market mechanism of control rights, strengthening the reporting of equity investment, and introducing the hearing of witnesses by small shareholders.