管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
Management Sciences in China
2009年
2期
57~63
,共null页
力量不对等供应链 Bertrand寡头模型 双种群演化模型 演化稳定策略
力量不對等供應鏈 Bertrand寡頭模型 雙種群縯化模型 縯化穩定策略
역량불대등공응련 Bertrand과두모형 쌍충군연화모형 연화은정책략
supply chain with unbalanced bargaining power ; Bertrand duopoly model ; double groups' evolutionary model ; evolutionary stable strategies
针对目前普遍存在的供应链上下游由于力量不对等而导致的强势一方向弱势一方转嫁成本的现状,研究力量不对等供应链上零售寡头对上游供应商的行为策略。建立竞争环境下的Bertrand寡头模型,得到双寡头采用不同行为策略的支付矩阵。在此基础上,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型进行分析,得到双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化稳定均衡。研究结果表明,由于零售寡头之间的竞争,随着寡头对供应商利益侵占数额的增大,双寡头对上游供应商的均衡策略依次为(转嫁成本,转嫁成本)、(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)以及(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)与(不转嫁成本,转嫁成本)共存的情况。同时进一步指出市场容量、寡头实力差距、侵占度等参数变化对演化稳定均衡的影响。
針對目前普遍存在的供應鏈上下遊由于力量不對等而導緻的彊勢一方嚮弱勢一方轉嫁成本的現狀,研究力量不對等供應鏈上零售寡頭對上遊供應商的行為策略。建立競爭環境下的Bertrand寡頭模型,得到雙寡頭採用不同行為策略的支付矩陣。在此基礎上,應用縯化博弈論中雙種群縯化模型進行分析,得到雙寡頭對上遊供應商行為的縯化穩定均衡。研究結果錶明,由于零售寡頭之間的競爭,隨著寡頭對供應商利益侵佔數額的增大,雙寡頭對上遊供應商的均衡策略依次為(轉嫁成本,轉嫁成本)、(轉嫁成本,不轉嫁成本)以及(轉嫁成本,不轉嫁成本)與(不轉嫁成本,轉嫁成本)共存的情況。同時進一步指齣市場容量、寡頭實力差距、侵佔度等參數變化對縯化穩定均衡的影響。
침대목전보편존재적공응련상하유유우역량불대등이도치적강세일방향약세일방전가성본적현상,연구역량불대등공응련상령수과두대상유공응상적행위책략。건립경쟁배경하적Bertrand과두모형,득도쌍과두채용불동행위책략적지부구진。재차기출상,응용연화박혁론중쌍충군연화모형진행분석,득도쌍과두대상유공응상행위적연화은정균형。연구결과표명,유우령수과두지간적경쟁,수착과두대공응상이익침점수액적증대,쌍과두대상유공응상적균형책략의차위(전가성본,전가성본)、(전가성본,불전가성본)이급(전가성본,불전가성본)여(불전가성본,전가성본)공존적정황。동시진일보지출시장용량、과두실력차거、침점도등삼수변화대연화은정균형적영향。
Targeting at the ubiquity of transferring cost from powerful member to weak one for their unbalanced bargaining power, we study the behavior of the retailer duopoly to their upstream supplier on supply chain with unbalanced bargaining power. We construct a Bertrand duopoly model with competition so as to obtain a payoff matrix of different behavior strategies. On this basis, using double groups' evolutionary model in evolutionary game theory we get the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the duopoly's behavior under different conditions. We show that for the competition between retailer duopoly, with increasing the amount of embezzlement, the evolutionary stable strategies are respectively ( transferring cost, transferring cost ), ( transferring cost, not transferring cost) and (transferring cost, not transferring cost) coexisting with (not transferring cost, transferring cost). The affections of the factors such as market capacity, strength gap of duopoly and the degree of cmbezzlemenl to the ESS have also been analyzed.