CAJ | 학술논문

本文结合中国经济转轨时期的实际情况，从福利损失和经济稳定性角度出发，比较分析事先承诺和相机抉择这两大最优货币政策规则，研究结果表明：一方面考虑到总需求冲击、总供给冲击和实际汇率冲击对经济产出、通胀、名义利率和实际汇率等各方面方面的影响时，事先承诺的最优货币政策规则对经济稳定性影响要小于相机抉择规则；另一方面事先承诺最优货币政策规则的社会福利损失明显小于相机抉择的福利损失，尤其是中央银行对产出的稳定趋向偏好时。因此，中国人民银行应该注重并采纳事先承诺的最优货币政策规则并为其应用创造各种条件。
본문결합중국경제전궤시기적실제정황，종복리손실화경제은정성각도출발，비교분석사선승낙화상궤결택저량대최우화폐정책규칙，연구결과표명：일방면고필도총수구충격、총공급충격화실제회솔충격대경제산출、통창、명의리솔화실제회솔등각방면방면적영향시，사선승낙적최우화폐정책규칙대경제은정성영향요소우상궤결택규칙；령일방면사선승낙최우화폐정책규칙적사회복리손실명현소우상궤결택적복리손실，우기시중앙은행대산출적은정추향편호시。인차，중국인민은행응해주중병채납사선승낙적최우화폐정책규칙병위기응용창조각충조건。
Considering the loss of welfare and the economy stabilization, this paper gives an analysis on the selection between the precommitment optimal monetary policy and the discretion optimal monetary policy in China. On the one hand, we compare the dynamic response of the economy following a one-unit cost-push shock, demand shock and real exchange rate shock under precommitment and discretion. We find that under precommitment the impacts of there shocks on the economy stabilization are smaller than the impact under discretion. On the other hand, we find that in the discretionary equilibrium, output is over-stabilized while inflation is too volatile, leading to lower welfare than under precommitment. Therefore, it is reasonable for central bank to justify institutional reforms adopting the precommitment monetary policy rule in Chinese actual economies and actively create necessary conditions for implementing this policy rule.