CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立信号传递博弈模型，分析了不完全信息下求职者的受教育行为。在使自身效用最大化的前提下，不同求职者能力类型之间相差越小，高潜质求职者越倾向选择比完全信息均衡条件下更高的教育水平。结果导致了市场上求职者的受教育程度不断提高，并在某种程度上出现了过度教育的趋向。根据分析结果，本文提出了增加专用性投资，实行培训生制度，改变求职方向等一系列措施来改进市场效率。
통과건립신호전체박혁모형，분석료불완전신식하구직자적수교육행위。재사자신효용최대화적전제하，불동구직자능력류형지간상차월소，고잠질구직자월경향선택비완전신식균형조건하경고적교육수평。결과도치료시장상구직자적수교육정도불단제고，병재모충정도상출현료과도교육적추향。근거분석결과，본문제출료증가전용성투자，실행배훈생제도，개변구직방향등일계렬조시래개진시장효솔。
Using signaling game model, this paper discusses how job seekers of diverse types choose different levels of education under the condition of incomplete job-market information. To maximize their utilities, job seekers with higher ability demand more education than those who own lower ability especially in the case they exceed others a little. As it goes on, the job seekers＇ degree will keep rising and the educational signal they delivered is over signaling to some extent. At last the paper advances some measures for betterment such as increasing special investment, generalizing trainee program, alternating the target position to promote the market efficiency.