CAJ | 학술논문

在投资者保护有限的环境下,从终极所有者效用最大化的角度出发,构建了其在金字塔结构与水平结构间进行选择时的选择效应模型,并以2001年至2005年815个民营金字塔企业观测值和141个民营水平企业观测值为样本,运用Logistic分析方法进行了检验。结果表明,当该企业的投资规模较大、预期收益较低、投资者保护较差时终极所有者会选择金字塔结构,反之则会选择水平结构。我国金字塔企业的举债能力并没有显著低于水平企业,这可能是源于金字塔企业的投资规模效应或声誉动机。
재투자자보호유한적배경하,종종겁소유자효용최대화적각도출발,구건료기재금자탑결구여수평결구간진행선택시적선택효응모형,병이2001년지2005년815개민영금자탑기업관측치화141개민영수평기업관측치위양본,운용Logistic분석방법진행료검험。결과표명,당해기업적투자규모교대、예기수익교저、투자자보호교차시종겁소유자회선택금자탑결구,반지칙회선택수평결구。아국금자탑기업적거채능력병몰유현저저우수평기업,저가능시원우금자탑기업적투자규모효응혹성예동궤。
Under the circumstance of limited investor protection, the paper presents a selection effect model from the sight of the maximal utility of ultimate owner and tests the model using 815 private pyramidal firm-year observations and 141 private horizontal firm-year observations during 2001 - 2005. The result suggests that ultimate owner will choose the pyramidal structure when the investment scale is larger, revenues is lower and investor protection is poor. The debt financing level in pyramidal firms isn＇t significant lower than that in horizontal firms, which is caused by the investment scale effect or reputation motivation.