CAJ | 학술논문

对当前普遍存在的企业排污费管制的低效问题，本文利用混合策略理论，构建了排污企业与环境管制部门之间的静态博弈模型，通过对影响混合策略均衡形成的关键变量的研究，剖析了排污费管制效率生成的内部作用机制。研究发现：排污费额度、监管机构尽职收益、失职成本、企业外部损失、上级环境管制部门的监督力度、环境监管成本等变量的变动调整，以及相互作用决定了排污管制效率状况。
대당전보편존재적기업배오비관제적저효문제，본문이용혼합책략이론，구건료배오기업여배경관제부문지간적정태박혁모형，통과대영향혼합책략균형형성적관건변량적연구，부석료배오비관제효솔생성적내부작용궤제。연구발현：배오비액도、감관궤구진직수익、실직성본、기업외부손실、상급배경관제부문적감독력도、배경감관성본등변량적변동조정，이급상호작용결정료배오관제효솔상황。
Focusing on the problem of inefficiency of the current emission charge system, utilize the mixed strategy theory, established a static game model of emission enterprises and environmental management. By studying the key variables that effect on the formation of a mixed strategy equilibrium, analyzed the efficiency of the internal emissions control mechanism. The paper identifies that variable adjustment and interaction determines the efficiency of emission control by adjusting variables, these variables such as the fines of over emission, fidelity earnings of the regulatory, the cost of dereliction of duty, the external loss of enterprises, the supervision level of superior department, the cost of environmental regulatory.