CAJ | 학술논문

在过去10年里，人们逐渐关注存在多个大股东的制衡型股权结构对公司行为和价值的影响。本文构造了一个委托代理模型来刻画监督股东如何通过合约的设计来影响控股股东的股权比例选择和投资行为。本文发现存在控股比例上限，而当信息不对称时，控股股东的最优持股比取决于控股股东的努力的边际产出和边际成本之比，资本的边际产出则较低，而监督股东的监督成本则与控股股东的私人收益有关。
재과거10년리，인문축점관주존재다개대고동적제형형고권결구대공사행위화개치적영향。본문구조료일개위탁대리모형래각화감독고동여하통과합약적설계래영향공고고동적고권비례선택화투자행위。본문발현존재공고비례상한，이당신식불대칭시，공고고동적최우지고비취결우공고고동적노력적변제산출화변제성본지비，자본적변제산출칙교저，이감독고동적감독성본칙여공고고동적사인수익유관。
In the past decade, more researches are gathered on the effect of ownership structure, especially when there exists multiple shareholders. This paper conceives a principle-agency model to describe the behavior of both the monitoring and controlling shareholder. We detail the contract with witch the agency-controlling shareholder would chose the optimal effort and investment. We get the upper line of the control share, and with moral hazard, there is a lower marginal output of capital, and the optimal structure is associated with marginal output and marginal cost of effort, the monitoring cost is associated with the private benefit of controlling shareholder.