CAJ | 학술논문

本文在Barrett（1994）的模型中引入工会，研究环境倾销是否为稳健的战略性环境政策，得到的结论如下：第一，在企业进行产量竞争的情况下，环境倾销是本国政府的最优政策；并且，它的程度比不存在工会情况下的环境倾销程度更大。第二，在企业进行价格竞争的情况下，本国政府的最优环境政策取决于本国工会的工资议价能力和两个企业产品的差异程度的相互作用。一方面，只要本国工会的工资议价能力充分强，本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。另一方面，给定本国工会具有工资议价能力，那么，只要两个企业产品的差异程度充分大，本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。第三，以上讨论蕴含环境倾销可以成为对有工会的国际寡头竞争市场的稳健的战略性环境政策。
본문재Barrett（1994）적모형중인입공회，연구배경경소시부위은건적전략성배경정책，득도적결론여하：제일，재기업진행산량경쟁적정황하，배경경소시본국정부적최우정책；병차，타적정도비불존재공회정황하적배경경소정도경대。제이，재기업진행개격경쟁적정황하，본국정부적최우배경정책취결우본국공회적공자의개능력화량개기업산품적차이정도적상호작용。일방면，지요본국공회적공자의개능력충분강，본국정부취회채취배경경소정책。령일방면，급정본국공회구유공자의개능력，나요，지요량개기업산품적차이정도충분대，본국정부취회채취배경경소정책。제삼，이상토론온함배경경소가이성위대유공회적국제과두경쟁시장적은건적전략성배경정책。
This paper studies whether environmental dumping is a robust environmental policy recommendation toward international unionized oligopolies. We introduce trade unions to Barrett （1994） model and show that：（i） When firms compete as Cournot competitors, govemments engage in environmental dumping policies; and the extent to which environmental taxes deviate from the Pivogian taxes is bigger than in the case where there do not exist trade unions. （ii） When firms compete as Bertrand competitors, optimal environmental policies are determined by the interaction between trade unions＇ bargaining strength and the degree of product differentiation. If trade union＇s bargaining strength is sufficient; or fixing trade unions＇ bargaining strength, if the degree of product differentiation is sufficient, governments engage in environmental dumping policies. （iii） These imply that environmental dumping could be a robust policy recommendation toward international unionized oligopolies.