财经科学
財經科學
재경과학
Finance and Economics
2009年
6期
117~124
,共null页
高校管理 三重委托代理关系 博弈模型
高校管理 三重委託代理關繫 博弈模型
고교관리 삼중위탁대리관계 박혁모형
Management of universities; Three principal- agent relations; Game model
中国公立的研究型大学存在多重委托代理关系:国家与学校的委托代理关系、学校与教师的委托代理关系、教师与学生的委托代理关系。针对高校普遍存在的三重委托代理关系中的教师与学生委托关系,本文分别通过建立静态、动态博弈模型进行分析,并得出一个基本的结论:激励机制有效的关键是存在恰当的第三方。
中國公立的研究型大學存在多重委託代理關繫:國傢與學校的委託代理關繫、學校與教師的委託代理關繫、教師與學生的委託代理關繫。針對高校普遍存在的三重委託代理關繫中的教師與學生委託關繫,本文分彆通過建立靜態、動態博弈模型進行分析,併得齣一箇基本的結論:激勵機製有效的關鍵是存在恰噹的第三方。
중국공립적연구형대학존재다중위탁대리관계:국가여학교적위탁대리관계、학교여교사적위탁대리관계、교사여학생적위탁대리관계。침대고교보편존재적삼중위탁대리관계중적교사여학생위탁관계,본문분별통과건립정태、동태박혁모형진행분석,병득출일개기본적결론:격려궤제유효적관건시존재흡당적제삼방。
There are multiple principal- agent relationships in Chinese public research universities: the principal - agent relationship between the state and school, the principal- agent relationship between school and teachers and the principal- agent relationship between teachers and students. For the principal- agent relationship between teachers and students in the three principal- agent relations which widespread in colleges and universities, this article respectively uses the static and dynamic game models to make analysis, and comes to a basic conclusion that the key to an effective incentive mechanism is the existence of appropri- ate third-party.