CAJ | 학술논문

一些操作风险研究者曾提出对产生失误但上报事故的员工应给予免责以代替惩戒。一些国际金融机构的相关尝试至今还没有取得完全令人满意的经验。究竟什么样的激励机制是有效的，奖励还是惩罚？本文建立了一个双重目标的控制操作失误的激励机制模型，并用博弈论理论进行了分析。该模型理论上的帕累托最优是一种”胡萝卜加大棒”的组合策略。实务中可操作的次优工资策略是对于不同类型的操作失误事故根据其审计难度与可能造成的损失、延误处置导致的损失增加、可能的最大处罚等之间的关系设计不同的激励工资契约。
일사조작풍험연구자증제출대산생실오단상보사고적원공응급여면책이대체징계。일사국제금융궤구적상관상시지금환몰유취득완전령인만의적경험。구경십요양적격려궤제시유효적，장려환시징벌？본문건립료일개쌍중목표적공제조작실오적격려궤제모형，병용박혁론이론진행료분석。해모형이론상적파루탁최우시일충”호라복가대봉”적조합책략。실무중가조작적차우공자책략시대우불동류형적조작실오사고근거기심계난도여가능조성적손실、연오처치도치적손실증가、가능적최대처벌등지간적관계설계불동적격려공자계약。
Some experts of operational risk management put forward that financial enterprise should provide indemnity against disciplinary proceedings to those who caused and reported events. The experiences of several international enterprises so far have not been completely satisfactory. Which incentive mechanism is more effective, rewards or punishments？ A dual-purpose incentive mechanism model for operational mistakes control was constructed, and was analyzed with the game theory. The theoretical Pareto dominance of the model is a system of ＂carrot-and-stick＂. The second best exercisable salary policy are diverse salary policies made according to each kind of mistakes and the relationships between its hardness of audit, possible loss, increase in loss caused by delay disposition and possibly maximum fine.