金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2009年
7期
25~37
,共null页
渡边真理子 柳川范之
渡邊真理子 柳川範之
도변진리자 류천범지
商业信用 合同执行 公司治理 技术外溢 现金需求
商業信用 閤同執行 公司治理 技術外溢 現金需求
상업신용 합동집행 공사치리 기술외일 현금수구
trade credit, contract enforcement, corporate governance, spillover of technology, demand for cash
本文测算了商业信用合同违约风险对商业贸易和现金需求的影响。结果显示,外国直接投资企业为其贸易伙伴提供了大量商业信用,而中国的企业,无论是私营,还是国有企业,他们交易实行货到即时付款的比例很高。外国直接投资企业之所以是经济交易中信贷的提供者,是因为他们具有较高的商业信用“合同执行技术(contract enforcement technology)”。我们还发现商业信用合同的执行技术主要包括贸易物品的竞争力、竞争幅度、与地方政府的关系以及公司治理的性质。一个企业具有较高的合同执行概率,就可能提供大量的商业信用,并获得更大的交易量。合同执行技术对贸易交易量的弹性估计约为2.2。模拟显示如果合同执行概率提高,分布在75%,贸易交易量可增加24%,商业信用规模可增加30%。由于商业信用合约的不完备而导致的经济损失则是巨大的。此外,我们证实,高的商业信用合同执行技术通过商业信用量和交易量的增加而在经济中产生正外部效应。
本文測算瞭商業信用閤同違約風險對商業貿易和現金需求的影響。結果顯示,外國直接投資企業為其貿易夥伴提供瞭大量商業信用,而中國的企業,無論是私營,還是國有企業,他們交易實行貨到即時付款的比例很高。外國直接投資企業之所以是經濟交易中信貸的提供者,是因為他們具有較高的商業信用“閤同執行技術(contract enforcement technology)”。我們還髮現商業信用閤同的執行技術主要包括貿易物品的競爭力、競爭幅度、與地方政府的關繫以及公司治理的性質。一箇企業具有較高的閤同執行概率,就可能提供大量的商業信用,併穫得更大的交易量。閤同執行技術對貿易交易量的彈性估計約為2.2。模擬顯示如果閤同執行概率提高,分佈在75%,貿易交易量可增加24%,商業信用規模可增加30%。由于商業信用閤約的不完備而導緻的經濟損失則是巨大的。此外,我們證實,高的商業信用閤同執行技術通過商業信用量和交易量的增加而在經濟中產生正外部效應。
본문측산료상업신용합동위약풍험대상업무역화현금수구적영향。결과현시,외국직접투자기업위기무역화반제공료대량상업신용,이중국적기업,무론시사영,환시국유기업,타문교역실행화도즉시부관적비례흔고。외국직접투자기업지소이시경제교역중신대적제공자,시인위타문구유교고적상업신용“합동집행기술(contract enforcement technology)”。아문환발현상업신용합동적집행기술주요포괄무역물품적경쟁력、경쟁폭도、여지방정부적관계이급공사치리적성질。일개기업구유교고적합동집행개솔,취가능제공대량적상업신용,병획득경대적교역량。합동집행기술대무역교역량적탄성고계약위2.2。모의현시여과합동집행개솔제고,분포재75%,무역교역량가증가24%,상업신용규모가증가30%。유우상업신용합약적불완비이도치적경제손실칙시거대적。차외,아문증실,고적상업신용합동집행기술통과상업신용량화교역량적증가이재경제중산생정외부효응。
This paper measured the impact on default risk of trade credit contracts over the economic transaction and cash demand. The results showed that foreign direct investment (FDI) firms extended larger trade credits to their trading partner, whereas there were high ratios of cash on delivery in transactions among Chinese firms, both privately and publicly owned firms. FDI firms are the providers of credit in the economy as they have high- er "enforcement technology" of trade credits. We also found that the enforcement technology of trade credit con- tracts is mainly comprised of the competitiveness of traded goods, the function of local government players, and the nature of corporate governance. A firm with a higher enforcement probability would provide a larger trade credit and enjoy larger transaction volumes. Elasticity of "enforcement technology" to economic transaction vol- ume was estimated to be approximately 2.2. Simulations showed that if the enforcement probability was raised so that it was distributed uniformly at 75%, the volume of economic transactions would increase by 24% and the size of trade credits would increase by 30%. Economic losses due to the incompleteness of the trade credit contract were proved to be significant. Furthermore, we confirmed that high trade credit contract enforcement technology had a positive external effect through increasing trade credit and transaction volumes in the economy.