CAJ | 학술논문

研究存在市场进入的可能时耐用品行业在位者和进入者的销售、定价、产品创新和市场进入策略，模型为基于古诺竞争的两阶段博弈。与伯川德竞争方式相比，主要的新结论有：在位者不创新并容纳进入的结局中，进入者会实行交叉升级政策，价格歧视可以实现；在位者进行产品创新并容纳进入的结局是可能发生的；如果在位者容纳市场进入，它就不会在第一阶段过量销售老产品；容纳进入时在位者的利润并非一定小于遏制进入时的利润；当存在遏制进入的可能时，在位者也可能会选择容纳进入；在参数的不同取值范围中分析得出了企业的均衡产品创新策略和市场进入策略。
연구존재시장진입적가능시내용품행업재위자화진입자적소수、정개、산품창신화시장진입책략，모형위기우고낙경쟁적량계단박혁。여백천덕경쟁방식상비，주요적신결론유：재위자불창신병용납진입적결국중，진입자회실행교차승급정책，개격기시가이실현；재위자진행산품창신병용납진입적결국시가능발생적；여과재위자용납시장진입，타취불회재제일계단과량소수로산품；용납진입시재위자적리윤병비일정소우알제진입시적리윤；당존재알제진입적가능시，재위자야가능회선택용납진입；재삼수적불동취치범위중분석득출료기업적균형산품창신책략화시장진입책략。
This paper analyzes strategies of sales, pricing, product innovation and market entry of an incumbent and an entrant in the industry of durable goods when there are possibilities of market entry based on a two-period game model of Cournot competition between new products. Compared with the model based on Bertrand competition, the major new findings are： when the outcome is incumbent not innovating and accommodating entry, entrant may implement cross-upgrade policy and price discrimination; The outcome of incumbent innovating and accommodating entry may occur; If the incumbent accommodates entry, it will not sell too many old products in the first period; When accommodating entry, the profit of incumbent may be higher than its profits when deterring entry; Even if it can deter entry, the incumbent may choose to accommodate entry ; By analyzing, firms＇ equilibrium strategies of product innovation and market entry have been found in different value-taking ranges of parameters.