管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2009年
3期
72~79
,共null页
熊中楷 聂佳佳 李根道
熊中楷 聶佳佳 李根道
웅중해 섭가가 리근도
市场份额 品牌广告 大类广告 汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程 微分对策 反馈Nash均衡
市場份額 品牌廣告 大類廣告 漢密爾頓-雅可比-貝爾曼方程 微分對策 反饋Nash均衡
시장빈액 품패엄고 대류엄고 한밀이돈-아가비-패이만방정 미분대책 반궤Nash균형
market share; brand advertising; generic advertising; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; differential game; feedback Nash equilibrium
本文利用微分对策理论研究了多寡头品牌和大类广告策略,发展了Bass等的双寡头竞争模型,提出了一个多方竞争下的微分对策模型,采用汉密尔顿.雅可比一贝尔曼方程求得了模型的均衡价格、品牌广告、大类广告和价值函数,给出了市场份额计算公式,推广了Prasad和Sethi的结论,同时发现市场中只有两家或三家企业时总能保证企业得到正利润,一旦企业数量增多则不能保证。
本文利用微分對策理論研究瞭多寡頭品牌和大類廣告策略,髮展瞭Bass等的雙寡頭競爭模型,提齣瞭一箇多方競爭下的微分對策模型,採用漢密爾頓.雅可比一貝爾曼方程求得瞭模型的均衡價格、品牌廣告、大類廣告和價值函數,給齣瞭市場份額計算公式,推廣瞭Prasad和Sethi的結論,同時髮現市場中隻有兩傢或三傢企業時總能保證企業得到正利潤,一旦企業數量增多則不能保證。
본문이용미분대책이론연구료다과두품패화대류엄고책략,발전료Bass등적쌍과두경쟁모형,제출료일개다방경쟁하적미분대책모형,채용한밀이돈.아가비일패이만방정구득료모형적균형개격、품패엄고、대류엄고화개치함수,급출료시장빈액계산공식,추엄료Prasad화Sethi적결론,동시발현시장중지유량가혹삼가기업시총능보증기업득도정리윤,일단기업수량증다칙불능보증。
This paper studies competitive brand and generic advertising strategies in oligopoly with differential game and offers a differential game model which extends the duopoly model of Bass et al. The paper obtains the equilibrium price, brand advertising, generic advertising, value function and the equation of market share which expands the conclusion in Prasad and Sethi. This paper also shows the firms could get positive profit for duopoly and triopoly but the firms may not get positive profit when there are more than three firms.