经济研究
經濟研究
경제연구
Economic Research Journal
2009年
9期
140~151
,共null页
委托代理 会计信息鉴证 注册会计师独立性
委託代理 會計信息鑒證 註冊會計師獨立性
위탁대리 회계신식감증 주책회계사독립성
Entrusted agency; Accounting Information Assurance; Auditor Independence
本文尝试在引入鉴证收费、声誉回报、市场竞争份额回报、额外鉴证费用补偿和市场监管情况下,构建一个投资者、经营者和注册会计师的动态博弈模型,探讨经营者报告会计信息和注册会计师鉴证会计信息的行为动机形成过程。研究发现:由投资者鉴证需求创造的会计信息鉴证市场本身具有维护注册会计师独立性的机制。在会计信息和非鉴证服务未被过度使用情况下,鉴证市场能够使得注册会计师保持独立性。在会计信息和非鉴证服务被过度使用时,才需要对注册会计师进行额外鉴证费用补偿,以弥补鉴证市场的失灵。本文给出了注册会计师额外鉴证费用补偿函数的一般表达式,以往的研究只是其特例。注册会计师鉴证收费、声誉回报、市场竞争份额回报、额外鉴证费用补偿和市场监管均具有防范注册会计师道德风险的作用,且具有相互替代作用效应。因此,引导鉴证市场建立良好的运行机制,远比单纯强调市场监管有效。
本文嘗試在引入鑒證收費、聲譽迴報、市場競爭份額迴報、額外鑒證費用補償和市場鑑管情況下,構建一箇投資者、經營者和註冊會計師的動態博弈模型,探討經營者報告會計信息和註冊會計師鑒證會計信息的行為動機形成過程。研究髮現:由投資者鑒證需求創造的會計信息鑒證市場本身具有維護註冊會計師獨立性的機製。在會計信息和非鑒證服務未被過度使用情況下,鑒證市場能夠使得註冊會計師保持獨立性。在會計信息和非鑒證服務被過度使用時,纔需要對註冊會計師進行額外鑒證費用補償,以瀰補鑒證市場的失靈。本文給齣瞭註冊會計師額外鑒證費用補償函數的一般錶達式,以往的研究隻是其特例。註冊會計師鑒證收費、聲譽迴報、市場競爭份額迴報、額外鑒證費用補償和市場鑑管均具有防範註冊會計師道德風險的作用,且具有相互替代作用效應。因此,引導鑒證市場建立良好的運行機製,遠比單純彊調市場鑑管有效。
본문상시재인입감증수비、성예회보、시장경쟁빈액회보、액외감증비용보상화시장감관정황하,구건일개투자자、경영자화주책회계사적동태박혁모형,탐토경영자보고회계신식화주책회계사감증회계신식적행위동궤형성과정。연구발현:유투자자감증수구창조적회계신식감증시장본신구유유호주책회계사독립성적궤제。재회계신식화비감증복무미피과도사용정황하,감증시장능구사득주책회계사보지독립성。재회계신식화비감증복무피과도사용시,재수요대주책회계사진행액외감증비용보상,이미보감증시장적실령。본문급출료주책회계사액외감증비용보상함수적일반표체식,이왕적연구지시기특례。주책회계사감증수비、성예회보、시장경쟁빈액회보、액외감증비용보상화시장감관균구유방범주책회계사도덕풍험적작용,차구유상호체대작용효응。인차,인도감증시장건립량호적운행궤제,원비단순강조시장감관유효。
The purpose of this study is to construct a dynamic game model concerning with investors, managers and auditor by introducing assurance charge, reputation capital, market competition rewards, additional assurance compensation, and market supervision for discussing the process of interests motivation forming when the manager reports and the auditor verifies accounting information. Extant research finds that the assurance market, which is created by investors' demand for assurance of accounting information, has its own mechanism for maintenance of auditor independence. This study shows that if accounting information and non-audit service are not overused, the assurance market can maintain the independence of auditor; otherwise, additional assurance compensation for assurance to auditor is needed to compensate for failure of the assurance market. It plays a role in preventing moral risk of the auditor by various factors as assurance charge, reputation rewards, market competition rewards, additional assurance compensation and market supervision with mutual substitution effect. Therefore, it is more effective by establishing an operating mechanism in assurance market than simply emphasizing external supervision.