CAJ | 학술논문

在多任务委托代理关系的闭环供应链中,制造商为委托人,而零售商为代理人。零售商的任务有二：销售制造商的产品以及从顾客中收集其废旧产品。通过比较非对称和对称信息下的线性激励合同,分析了不同参数对激励系数、制造商的决策,以及制造商的期望收入的影响。同时也分析了市场不确定性和风险规避因子对制造商赢利的影响。
재다임무위탁대리관계적폐배공응련중,제조상위위탁인,이령수상위대리인。령수상적임무유이：소수제조상적산품이급종고객중수집기폐구산품。통과비교비대칭화대칭신식하적선성격려합동,분석료불동삼수대격려계수、제조상적결책,이급제조상적기망수입적영향。동시야분석료시장불학정성화풍험규피인자대제조상영리적영향。
In a multi-task principal-agent closed-loop supply chain,the manufacturer acts as a principal and the retailer as agent.The retailer has two tasks： sell the manufacturer s products and recycle the waste products from the customers.By comparing the linear incentive contract under symmetric information with that under asymmetric information,we analyze the effect of different parameters on the incentive coefficient,manufacturer s decision-making,and the expected income of the manufacturer.We also analyze the effect of market uncertainty and risk aversion on the manufacturer＇ s profit.