CAJ | 학술논문

本文构建了一个考虑故意违约成本和信息差异的信贷模型。模型分析表明，导致贷款人拒绝某类担保能力不足企业贷款申请的真正原因在于贷款人关于企业信用品质信息不完全，而非其它；提高企业的故意违约成本可以改善企业融资状况；信息和社会资本因不同主体的差异导致信贷市场存在一定程度的市场分割和垄断，最具效率的信贷制度安排应该让最适合的主体来为企业提供贷款或担保。因此，政府对待民间金融的恰当政策应该是予以规范和扶持；以外部担保额作为甄别机制，政府担保只能作为一种特别的财政补贴方式。
본문구건료일개고필고의위약성본화신식차이적신대모형。모형분석표명，도치대관인거절모류담보능력불족기업대관신청적진정원인재우대관인관우기업신용품질신식불완전，이비기타；제고기업적고의위약성본가이개선기업융자상황；신식화사회자본인불동주체적차이도치신대시장존재일정정도적시장분할화롱단，최구효솔적신대제도안배응해양최괄합적주체래위기업제공대관혹담보。인차，정부대대민간금융적흡당정책응해시여이규범화부지；이외부담보액작위견별궤제，정부담보지능작위일충특별적재정보첩방식。
In this paper, a model including information difference and deliberate default cost is set up. By using the model, we draw the following conclusions. The reason why a borrower class is redlined is the asymmetric information about the borrower＇s credit character, not others. Increasing the deliberate default cost can improve borrowers＇ financing condition. The differences between information and social capital endow the credit markets with character of segmentation and monopoly. The efficient credit system must assign appropriate lenders and guarantors to borrowers. The government should support and rule the civil financing. The premise of external guarantee as information screening institution includes marginal guarantee cost isn＇t zero and the lender knows it. The government guarantee can be implied just as special subsidy.