管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
Management Sciences in China
2009年
5期
2~12
,共null页
终极控制权 现金流权 产出增长效应 产出替代效应 全要素生产率 公司治理
終極控製權 現金流權 產齣增長效應 產齣替代效應 全要素生產率 公司治理
종겁공제권 현금류권 산출증장효응 산출체대효응 전요소생산솔 공사치리
ultimate control right; cash flow right; output growth effect; output substation effect; total factor productivity; corporate governance;
全要素生产率是衡量企业要素转化能力的基础性指标,能反映公司治理效率和经营管理水平的变化,有关终极控制股东的治理因素与其存在一定的内在联系。建立平衡面板数据模型,使用2003年~2007年中国制造业上市公司的实证数据,研究终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度、终极控制股东类型对公司全要素生产率的影响。研究结果显示,终极控制权在低水平时与公司全要素生产率正相关,产出增长效应占优;在高水平时与其负相关,产出替代效应占优,两者呈倒U型曲线关系。当产出增长效应向产出替代效应转化时,政府控制的公司转化的临界值最高、其他类型的次之、自然人或家族的最低。终极控制权与现金流权的分离程度、政府终极控制股东对公司全要素生产率均有显著负向影响。建议完善公司治理机制,提高终极控制链的信息披露质量,对终极控制股东形成有效监管,加强产出增长效应,弱化产出替代效应,以提升公司的全要素生产率。
全要素生產率是衡量企業要素轉化能力的基礎性指標,能反映公司治理效率和經營管理水平的變化,有關終極控製股東的治理因素與其存在一定的內在聯繫。建立平衡麵闆數據模型,使用2003年~2007年中國製造業上市公司的實證數據,研究終極控製權、終極控製權與現金流權分離程度、終極控製股東類型對公司全要素生產率的影響。研究結果顯示,終極控製權在低水平時與公司全要素生產率正相關,產齣增長效應佔優;在高水平時與其負相關,產齣替代效應佔優,兩者呈倒U型麯線關繫。噹產齣增長效應嚮產齣替代效應轉化時,政府控製的公司轉化的臨界值最高、其他類型的次之、自然人或傢族的最低。終極控製權與現金流權的分離程度、政府終極控製股東對公司全要素生產率均有顯著負嚮影響。建議完善公司治理機製,提高終極控製鏈的信息披露質量,對終極控製股東形成有效鑑管,加彊產齣增長效應,弱化產齣替代效應,以提升公司的全要素生產率。
전요소생산솔시형량기업요소전화능력적기출성지표,능반영공사치리효솔화경영관리수평적변화,유관종겁공제고동적치리인소여기존재일정적내재련계。건립평형면판수거모형,사용2003년~2007년중국제조업상시공사적실증수거,연구종겁공제권、종겁공제권여현금류권분리정도、종겁공제고동류형대공사전요소생산솔적영향。연구결과현시,종겁공제권재저수평시여공사전요소생산솔정상관,산출증장효응점우;재고수평시여기부상관,산출체대효응점우,량자정도U형곡선관계。당산출증장효응향산출체대효응전화시,정부공제적공사전화적림계치최고、기타류형적차지、자연인혹가족적최저。종겁공제권여현금류권적분리정도、정부종겁공제고동대공사전요소생산솔균유현저부향영향。건의완선공사치리궤제,제고종겁공제련적신식피로질량,대종겁공제고동형성유효감관,가강산출증장효응,약화산출체대효응,이제승공사적전요소생산솔。
Total factor productivity is a basic indicator to measure the ability of factor transformation of companies, which can reflect the changes of corporate governance efficiency and level of managerial expertise. Hence, the governance factors of the ultimate controlling shareholders have a certain degree of inherent relations with it. We establish a balanced panel data model and use the empirical data of Chinese listed manufacturing companies from 2003 to 2007 to study the influence of ultimate control fight and cash flow fight on firm's total factor productivity. The results of estimation show that the ultimate control right is positively related to firm's total factor productivity in a low level and the output growth effect is dominant. However, it is negatively related to firm's total factor productivity in a high level and the output substitution effect is dominant. An inverse U-curve relationship exists between ultimate control fight and firm's total factor productivity. While the output growth effect converts to the output substitution effect, the converting threshold of companies controlled by government is the highest. The threshold is the lowest when companies are controlled by nature person or family. Companies have the median threshold when their ultimate controlling shareholders are other types. Moreover, the separation between ultimate control right and cash flow fight is negatively related to firm's total factor productivity. If the ultimate controlling shareholder is government, it also will have negative impact on firm's total factor productivity significantly. The mechanism of corporate governance and the quality of the information disclosure of ultimate control chains should be improved so as to monitor the ultimate controlling shareholder effectively. The firm's productivity should be increased by enhancing the output growth effect and weakening the output substitution effect.