CAJ | 학술논문

探讨公司高管发动的并购行为与谋取个人私有收益行为之间的关联性，并尝试从高级管理层的私有收益角度对公司高管的并购行为进行研究。基于代理成本理论及中国高管薪酬管制和公司并购的特殊制度背景，以1999年-2007年全部A股上市公司为样本，采用固定效应回归、随机效应回归和分层回归的实证方法，得到一些重要结论。实证结果表明，中国上市公司并购已经成为高管谋取私有收益的机会主义行为，通过发动并购行动高管获得更高的薪酬和在职消费，而高管发动并购事件谋求在职消费的私有收益动机最为明显。通过分层回归还发现，目前中国的制度环境下管理者持股水平虽然相对较低，但这一股权激励的确能够适当缓解高管以谋取私有收益为目的而发动毁损股东价值的并购行为。
탐토공사고관발동적병구행위여모취개인사유수익행위지간적관련성，병상시종고급관리층적사유수익각도대공사고관적병구행위진행연구。기우대리성본이론급중국고관신수관제화공사병구적특수제도배경，이1999년-2007년전부A고상시공사위양본，채용고정효응회귀、수궤효응회귀화분층회귀적실증방법，득도일사중요결론。실증결과표명，중국상시공사병구이경성위고관모취사유수익적궤회주의행위，통과발동병구행동고관획득경고적신수화재직소비，이고관발동병구사건모구재직소비적사유수익동궤최위명현。통과분층회귀환발현，목전중국적제도배경하관리자지고수평수연상대교저，단저일고권격려적학능구괄당완해고관이모취사유수익위목적이발동훼손고동개치적병구행위。
This paper aims to investigate the association between executive private benefits and acquiring managers＇ M＆A decisions and attempts to shed new light on the causes and consequences of corporate M＆As from a fresh angle of executive private benefits. Considering Chna＇s regulation on executive compensation and special institutional features of corporate M＆As, the study investigates data from all China＇s listed companies over 1999 to 2007 based on Agency Theory. With the analysis of data by fixed effects regressions, random effects regressions and hierarchical regressions, we find significant empirical evidence. The results indicate that corporate executives launch M＆A deals for their opportunistic incentives of private benefits, and their pecuniary compensation and especially non-pecuniary compensation significantly increases following M＆As. By using hierarchical regressions, the paper also finds that equity-based compensation can partially alleviate executives＇ incentives to pursue private benefits via value-destroying M＆As even if the equity-based compensation is averagely low under current institutional environment.