财经论丛
財經論叢
재경론총
Collected Essays On Finance and Economics
2010年
1期
97~102
,共null页
董事会规模 风险偏好 企业边界
董事會規模 風險偏好 企業邊界
동사회규모 풍험편호 기업변계
the size of directorate; risk preference ; corporate vertical boundary
本文将董事会规模对企业边界的影响作为研究对象。研究结果发现，董事会规模与企业一体化程度呈U型关系，这表明董事会规模处于某个适度区间时，最有利于发挥其对经理的有效约束作用，使经理在决策时较少采用一体化的组织方式，而更多采用非一体化组织方式（如外包等）来得到更多的专业化分工利益。
本文將董事會規模對企業邊界的影響作為研究對象。研究結果髮現，董事會規模與企業一體化程度呈U型關繫，這錶明董事會規模處于某箇適度區間時，最有利于髮揮其對經理的有效約束作用，使經理在決策時較少採用一體化的組織方式，而更多採用非一體化組織方式（如外包等）來得到更多的專業化分工利益。
본문장동사회규모대기업변계적영향작위연구대상。연구결과발현，동사회규모여기업일체화정도정U형관계，저표명동사회규모처우모개괄도구간시，최유리우발휘기대경리적유효약속작용，사경리재결책시교소채용일체화적조직방식，이경다채용비일체화조직방식（여외포등）래득도경다적전업화분공이익。
The researches on the relationship between corporate ownership structure and corporate vertical boundaries are wanting. The theory of the finn rarely counts corporate ownership structure as one of the determinants of firm boundaries. The paper studies the effect of the number of directors or supervisors on corporate vertical boundaries, and concludes that there is an U-shaped relationship between them： both too many and too few directors or supervisors may reduce their effort to oversee managers, so the more risk-averse managers largely depend on vertical integration to deal with the risk from assets specificity.
