CAJ | 학술논문

本文选取深沪两地140家国有集团附属上市公司与100家非集团国有上市公司2003—2007年的平衡面板数据作为样本，从双重代理关系的视角实证分析了内部资本市场的运行效率。理论分析与经验证据均显示：（1）国有企业集团内部资本市场上的主导代理关系为管理层代理关系，而非控股股东代理关系，即影响国有企业集团内部资本市场效率的代理问题为管理层代理问题，国有控股股东由于“缺位”并没有将内部资本市场异化为其进行利益侵占的隐蔽渠道；（2）从集团总部层面来讲，内部资本市场能够有效配置资金，但从成员公司的层面来讲，总部与成员公司经理的代理问题使内部资本市场的功能受损。
본문선취심호량지140가국유집단부속상시공사여100가비집단국유상시공사2003—2007년적평형면판수거작위양본，종쌍중대리관계적시각실증분석료내부자본시장적운행효솔。이론분석여경험증거균현시：（1）국유기업집단내부자본시장상적주도대리관계위관리층대리관계，이비공고고동대리관계，즉영향국유기업집단내부자본시장효솔적대리문제위관리층대리문제，국유공고고동유우“결위”병몰유장내부자본시장이화위기진행이익침점적은폐거도；（2）종집단총부층면래강，내부자본시장능구유효배치자금，단종성원공사적층면래강，총부여성원공사경리적대리문제사내부자본시장적공능수손。
This paper analyses the efficiency of internal capital markets （ ICM ） in Chinese state - owned enterprise groups based on double principal - agent relationships. It considers the agency relationship between shareholders and managers not the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the leading principal - agency relations in ICM. Choosing the balance panel data of 140 listed companies affiliated to state - owned business group and 100 state - owned listed non - group companies as a sample, this paper makes empirical tests to do researches on the efficiency of ICM. The results support this paper＇ s theoretical assumptions, which suggest that headquarters can effectively allocate financial resources, but managers in affiliated companies couldn＇ t make the decision about optimal capital allocation, and state - owned controlling shareholders haven＇ t use ICM as a tunnel to rob the wealth of minority shareholders.