CAJ | 학술논문

在一般的组织和机构中几乎都存在着串谋现象，这是造成一个组织激励扭曲、效率低下的根本原因。在风险投资公司——监督人一风险企业家这一组织结构中也存在着串谋问题。因此，有必要根据三者的博弈关系，寻找一个防范串谋的合约。经过对防范串谋规划问题的求解可知，通过提高串谋侦查技术、加大对串谋行为被发现后的处罚力度或者增大监督人与风险企业家之间交易的难度等措施，可以有效防范控制串谋。
재일반적조직화궤구중궤호도존재착천모현상，저시조성일개조직격려뉴곡、효솔저하적근본원인。재풍험투자공사——감독인일풍험기업가저일조직결구중야존재착천모문제。인차，유필요근거삼자적박혁관계，심조일개방범천모적합약。경과대방범천모규화문제적구해가지，통과제고천모정사기술、가대대천모행위피발현후적처벌력도혹자증대감독인여풍험기업가지간교역적난도등조시，가이유효방범공제천모。
Collusion almost exists in distorted incentives inefficiency. C the all general organizations and institutions, which can cause ollusion also exists in a three-tier venture capital companysupervisor-venture entrepreneur model. Therefore, it is necessary to look for a collusion-proof contract according to the process of games among them. On the basis of solving the collusion-proof planning problem, we can conclude that collusion can be prevented and controlled efficiently by improving the investigative technique of collusion, and increasing the punishment after collusion has been found and the difficulty of transaction between supervisor and venture entrepreneur.