CAJ | 학술논문

依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性，在不完全契约理论框架下，建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明，企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型，从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键，子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为，企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。
의거식품공응련중기업여농호간적교역특성，재불완전계약이론광가하，건립료쌍방승낙불재진행협상적단기합작교역계약설계이론모형。연구결론표명，기업적시험대리인지위시보증농호재제일계단성실선고기류형，종이보증쌍방전용성투자위최우수평적관건，자박혁정련납십균형적주요한제위，기업지부함수필수위단조함수조건재불회설황。
Based on the transaction characteristics between the meatpacking enterprise and farmer in the food supply chain and the incomplete contract theory, the paper constitutes the short-term cooperate transaction contraction model with the hypothesis that the both parties promise not to renegotiate. The conclusions show that the status of enterprises as test-agents is crucial to ensure the farmer to declare his type honestly in order to guarantee the special investment of both the parties optimized, and the limitation of the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium is that the payment function of enterprise must be a monotonous one so that the enterprise can tell the truth.