商业研究
商業研究
상업연구
Commercial Research
2010年
3期
6~12
,共null页
双渠道供应链 创新补偿 创新
雙渠道供應鏈 創新補償 創新
쌍거도공응련 창신보상 창신
dual -channel supply chain; subsidy incentive; innovation
电子商务环境下渠道冲突与和谐并存问题受到越来越多关注，利用Stackelberg博弈，在价格竞争与价格敏感需求条件下，构建零售商以创新投入降低其分销成本、制造商对其创新投入实施策略性补偿激励的双渠道供应链模型，研究发现策略性创新激励补偿能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进、实现消费者福利改进。
電子商務環境下渠道遲突與和諧併存問題受到越來越多關註，利用Stackelberg博弈，在價格競爭與價格敏感需求條件下，構建零售商以創新投入降低其分銷成本、製造商對其創新投入實施策略性補償激勵的雙渠道供應鏈模型，研究髮現策略性創新激勵補償能實現製造商與零售商收益的Pareto改進、實現消費者福利改進。
전자상무배경하거도충돌여화해병존문제수도월래월다관주，이용Stackelberg박혁，재개격경쟁여개격민감수구조건하，구건령수상이창신투입강저기분소성본、제조상대기창신투입실시책략성보상격려적쌍거도공응련모형，연구발현책략성창신격려보상능실현제조상여령수상수익적Pareto개진、실현소비자복리개진。
The issues on the coexistence friendly and conflict in the dual - channel supply chain have attracted more and more attention in E - commerce. As a consequence, it set up a model to analyze that the traditional retailer made investments in innovation to reduce the operating cost and the manufacturer made investment to compensate for the retailer in a dual - channel supply chain by Stackelberg game under the conditions of price competition and price sensitive demand. It demonstrated that the innovation incentive investment can realize the profits of the retailers and the manufacturer as well as customers Pareto improvement.
