CAJ | 학술논문

可想象性论证是心灵哲学中的一个重要问题。传统的可想象论证集中于物理主义与反物理主义之争,但没有达成一致意见。查尔莫斯运用二维语义学对传统的可想象性论证进行了修正,重建了可想象性与可能性之间的联系。我们发现查尔莫斯并没有真正解决这个问题,他的论证仍然有缺陷,并不能真正驳倒物理主义。
가상상성론증시심령철학중적일개중요문제。전통적가상상론증집중우물리주의여반물리주의지쟁,단몰유체성일치의견。사이막사운용이유어의학대전통적가상상성론증진행료수정,중건료가상상성여가능성지간적련계。아문발현사이막사병몰유진정해결저개문제,타적론증잉연유결함,병불능진정박도물리주의。
In the contemporary philosophy of mind,a number of popular arguments against physicalism conclude that there is an ontological gap between physical process and consciousness just like the epistemic gap between physical truths and phenomenal truths,but physicalists hold that the epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion.By virtue of two-dimensional semantics and rebuilding the bridge between conceivability and possibility,Chalmers improves the traditional conceivability argument and argues that the inference from epistemic premises to ontological conclusion is reasonable.This is a real challenge for physicalism,but this paper argues that,with some deficiencies,the improved conceivability argument cannot actually confute physicalism.