CAJ | 학술논문

本文以最终控制者可以追溯到家族或自然人的民营上市公司为研究对象，将广义家族上市公司区分为“真正”或狭义家族上市公司（FB）和自然人上市公司（PB）两类，从家族所有、家族控制和家族管理三个维度考察了民营上市公司的家族治理对企业价值的影响。实证结果表明：总体上，家族治理降低了民营上市公司的价值，但家族所有、控制、管理三个维度的影响各不相同，家族治理的绩效最终取决于不同维度之间的组合。鉴于不同类型家族上市公司的主要回归结果皆不相同，本文认为家族企业的不同界定标准会在很大程度上影响到相关实证研究的结论。
본문이최종공제자가이추소도가족혹자연인적민영상시공사위연구대상，장엄의가족상시공사구분위“진정”혹협의가족상시공사（FB）화자연인상시공사（PB）량류，종가족소유、가족공제화가족관리삼개유도고찰료민영상시공사적가족치리대기업개치적영향。실증결과표명：총체상，가족치리강저료민영상시공사적개치，단가족소유、공제、관리삼개유도적영향각불상동，가족치리적적효최종취결우불동유도지간적조합。감우불동류형가족상시공사적주요회귀결과개불상동，본문인위가족기업적불동계정표준회재흔대정도상영향도상관실증연구적결론。
This article focuses on Chinese listed companies ultimately controlled by a family or an individual and investigates the effect of family governance on firm value in terms of family ownership, control and management. By dividing family- and individual- controlled listed companies into family firms （FBs） and person- controlled firms （PBs）, this article finds that family governance destroys the value of public firms on the whole, namely, family firms （FBs） doesn＇t show higher firm＇s value than person-controlled firms （PBs）, and the three fundamental elements of family governance including ownership, control and management, which play different roles respectively. Even in the same dimension of family management, some factors of governance play opposite role to firm＇s value, then the performance of family firms （FBs） is uncertain, in other words, the eventual performance is determined by the combination of different factors. The empirical results show that in family firms, family board presence and founder CEOs are associated with value gains, while family management involvement is negatively correlated with firm value, which suggests that altruism among family members aggravates the conflict between controller and other family members. In person-controlled firms, there is an inverted U-curve relation between ultimate ownership and firm value, also firm value is negatively correlated with the deviation of voting right from cashflow right, which suggests it＇s popular for controlling shareholder to extract private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. We conclude that empirical result highly depends on how family ownership, control and management are incorporated into the definition of a family firm since the regression results of our research vary greatly among differently defined family firms. The attribution of this study not only provide feasible suggestions for family business in China and optimize mechanism of governance and promote performance of governance, but also supply policy choice for management apartment of public company to improve and perfect supervising measure of family business. All of above will lead family business to the way of continual and healthy development.