改革
改革
개혁
Reform
2010年
3期
99~104
,共null页
双重委托代理问题 独立董事 独立性 大股东治理 股东整体利益（价值）
雙重委託代理問題 獨立董事 獨立性 大股東治理 股東整體利益（價值）
쌍중위탁대리문제 독립동사 독립성 대고동치리 고동정체이익（개치）
double principal-agent problem, independent directors, independence, governance of large shareholder, the whole shareholders profits （value）
“独立化”后的独立董事会削弱大股东治理机制的有效性．其本身也难以发挥监督经理层、保护股东利益的作用，从而可能诱发股东与经理层之间的利益冲突，损害股东整体利益。基于我国上市公司存在双重委托代理问题及投资者法律保护较弱的现实情况．构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构应从两方面着手：政府选择合适的国家终极产权控制方式和合理的代理人行使国有股股权优化大股东治理：制定和切实实行保护小股东的外部强制规则。
“獨立化”後的獨立董事會削弱大股東治理機製的有效性．其本身也難以髮揮鑑督經理層、保護股東利益的作用，從而可能誘髮股東與經理層之間的利益遲突，損害股東整體利益。基于我國上市公司存在雙重委託代理問題及投資者法律保護較弱的現實情況．構建具有中國特色的公司治理結構應從兩方麵著手：政府選擇閤適的國傢終極產權控製方式和閤理的代理人行使國有股股權優化大股東治理：製定和切實實行保護小股東的外部彊製規則。
“독립화”후적독립동사회삭약대고동치리궤제적유효성．기본신야난이발휘감독경리층、보호고동이익적작용，종이가능유발고동여경리층지간적이익충돌，손해고동정체이익。기우아국상시공사존재쌍중위탁대리문제급투자자법률보호교약적현실정황．구건구유중국특색적공사치리결구응종량방면착수：정부선택합괄적국가종겁산권공제방식화합리적대리인행사국유고고권우화대고동치리：제정화절실실행보호소고동적외부강제규칙。
The independence of independent directors must be reinforced in order to curb large shareholder and provide better protection to small shareholders. The paper studies how the independence reformation of independent directors would have an influence on agency cost between shareholders and managers based on the theory of double principal-agent. That is independent directors after reforming will impair governance effectiveness of large shareholder, and they also can＇t monitor managers and protect shareholders. As a result, sharp benefit conflicts between shareholders and managers will arise, and ultimately decrease the whole shareholders profits. The conclusion is of importance to construct the corporate governance structure with Chinese characteristics.
