西安财经学院学报
西安財經學院學報
서안재경학원학보
Journal of Xi‘an Institute of Finance & Economics
2010年
3期
77~81
,共null页
农村非点源 减排博弈 进化稳定策略 水污染治理
農村非點源 減排博弈 進化穩定策略 水汙染治理
농촌비점원 감배박혁 진화은정책략 수오염치리
agricultural non-point sources strategy; game theory of emission abatement; evolutionary stable strategy; water pollution rehablitation
农业非点源减排的实施是实现水环境质量和成本效率双重目标的关键。文章基于进化博弈理论，分析了有限理性的非点源农户之间、非点源农户与点源企业之间采取不同策略的群体比例的动态变化，以及进化稳定策略的对应条件，认为政府的干预力度和消费者的支付意愿及排污权交易的有效实施，可以改变非点源的博弈得益矩阵，进而诱导非点源选择减排策略。
農業非點源減排的實施是實現水環境質量和成本效率雙重目標的關鍵。文章基于進化博弈理論，分析瞭有限理性的非點源農戶之間、非點源農戶與點源企業之間採取不同策略的群體比例的動態變化，以及進化穩定策略的對應條件，認為政府的榦預力度和消費者的支付意願及排汙權交易的有效實施，可以改變非點源的博弈得益矩陣，進而誘導非點源選擇減排策略。
농업비점원감배적실시시실현수배경질량화성본효솔쌍중목표적관건。문장기우진화박혁이론，분석료유한이성적비점원농호지간、비점원농호여점원기업지간채취불동책략적군체비례적동태변화，이급진화은정책략적대응조건，인위정부적간예력도화소비자적지부의원급배오권교역적유효실시，가이개변비점원적박혁득익구진，진이유도비점원선택감배책략。
Implementing emission abatement in agricultural non-point sources is the key to achieve the dual goals of water quality and cost-efficiency. Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper analyzed the dynamic changes of the proportion of groups adopting different strategies, and the corresponding conditions of evolutionary stable strategies within non-point sources with limited rationality or between farmers and point-source business. The author concluded that the intensity of government intervention and willingness of consumer payment, as well as the effective implementation of emissions trading, which can change the benefit matrix of game between nonpoint sources, thereby induce non-point sources selecting the strategy of emissions reduction.
