CAJ | 학술논문

改革开放三十多年来,中国地方政府对于地方经济发展、制度创新与变革、实现宏观调控目标等做出了重要贡献,但由于中央对地方相对＂软化＂的制度约束环境以及自身独立的经济主体等多种因素,地方政府经济行为存在偏差,出现了违背追求全社会公共福利的行为变异。运用委托代理理论可从地方政府面临多任务委托合同、绩效评价标准缺乏参照、固定任期制导致短期行为严重以及地方政府间＂准联邦式＂竞争关系四方面分析行为变异的原因。
개혁개방삼십다년래,중국지방정부대우지방경제발전、제도창신여변혁、실현굉관조공목표등주출료중요공헌,단유우중앙대지방상대＂연화＂적제도약속배경이급자신독립적경제주체등다충인소,지방정부경제행위존재편차,출현료위배추구전사회공공복리적행위변이。운용위탁대리이론가종지방정부면림다임무위탁합동、적효평개표준결핍삼조、고정임기제도치단기행위엄중이급지방정부간＂준련방식＂경쟁관계사방면분석행위변이적원인。
Since the past three decades of reform and opening up,local governments in China have made an important contribution to local economic development,institutional innovation and reform to achieve macro-control targets.However,because of a variety of factors such as relatively ＂soft＂ bound from central to local governments and local independent economic entities,deviations have taken place in local governments＇ economic behavior,which has been contrary to the pursuit of the whole social and public welfare.By means of the Principal Agent Theory,this paper analyzes four aspects of the specific variation：（i）local governments that face multi-task entrusted to the contract,（ii）performance evaluation standards for the lack of reference,（iii）fixed-term system leading to serious short-term behavior,and（iv）the ＂quasi-federal＂ competitive relationship between local governments.