CAJ | 학술논문

针对制造商与零售商在共同努力减少客户无缺陷退货中的双边道德风险问题，本文分析了制造商和零售商的努力水平对无缺陷退货率的影响，运用委托～代理理论设计了双边道德风险下的收益共享合同，分析了各参数对合同的影响。结果表明，最优收益共享激励系数与制造商的努力弹性系数负相关，与零售商的努力弹性系数正相关，与产品的单位收益、产品的首次销售量以及双方的努力成本系数无关。
침대제조상여령수상재공동노력감소객호무결함퇴화중적쌍변도덕풍험문제，본문분석료제조상화령수상적노력수평대무결함퇴화솔적영향，운용위탁～대리이론설계료쌍변도덕풍험하적수익공향합동，분석료각삼수대합동적영향。결과표명，최우수익공향격려계수여제조상적노력탄성계수부상관，여령수상적노력탄성계수정상관，여산품적단위수익、산품적수차소수량이급쌍방적노력성본계수무관。
Aiming at double moral hazard for manufacturers and retailers to make concerted efforts to reduce customers false failure returns, this paper analyzes the influence of manufacturers＇ and retailers＇ efforts on false failure returns ratio, and a revenue sharing contract under double moral hazard is designed in terms of principal--agent theory and the influence of parameters on the contract is also analyzed. The results indicate that the optimal revenue sharing incentive coefficient is negatively related to manufacturers＇ effort elastic coefficient, and positively related to retailers＇ effort elastic.coefficient, and independent of the unit revenue of product, the first sales of product, and the cost coefficient of manufacturers and retailers.