经济管理
經濟管理
경제관리
Economic Management Journal（EMJ）
2010年
6期
135~145
,共null页
上市公司 恶意再融资 恶意形式 融资行为 融资动机
上市公司 噁意再融資 噁意形式 融資行為 融資動機
상시공사 악의재융자 악의형식 융자행위 융자동궤
listed companies ; malicious refinancing; malicious forms ; financing behavior; financing motivation
恶意再融资是近年中国资本市场发展过程中的焦点议题，现有相关研究主要囿于监管者视角，鲜见基于投资者视角所做的研究。本文针对上市公司恶意再融资表现形式及其相对重要性，对中部四省投资者做了较大规模的问卷调查。以此为基础，本文归纳出了上市公司再融资恶意的12种主要表现形式，发现“上市公司在再融资计划推出前1年给高管发放巨额薪酬”等6种行为是典型恶意行为。进一步地，本文研究认为，上市公司恶意再融资是在多层委托代理关系导致企业内外治理机制不完善的背景下，相关利益主体寻租活动的“理性”选择；现有的再融资审核监管程序对抑制上市公司恶意再融资行为作用有限；虽然恶意再融资行为对公司业绩具有负面影响，但在再融资监管不到位的情况下，受短期利益诱惑，上市公司仍热衷于恶意再融资。
噁意再融資是近年中國資本市場髮展過程中的焦點議題，現有相關研究主要囿于鑑管者視角，鮮見基于投資者視角所做的研究。本文針對上市公司噁意再融資錶現形式及其相對重要性，對中部四省投資者做瞭較大規模的問捲調查。以此為基礎，本文歸納齣瞭上市公司再融資噁意的12種主要錶現形式，髮現“上市公司在再融資計劃推齣前1年給高管髮放巨額薪酬”等6種行為是典型噁意行為。進一步地，本文研究認為，上市公司噁意再融資是在多層委託代理關繫導緻企業內外治理機製不完善的揹景下，相關利益主體尋租活動的“理性”選擇；現有的再融資審覈鑑管程序對抑製上市公司噁意再融資行為作用有限；雖然噁意再融資行為對公司業績具有負麵影響，但在再融資鑑管不到位的情況下，受短期利益誘惑，上市公司仍熱衷于噁意再融資。
악의재융자시근년중국자본시장발전과정중적초점의제，현유상관연구주요유우감관자시각，선견기우투자자시각소주적연구。본문침대상시공사악의재융자표현형식급기상대중요성，대중부사성투자자주료교대규모적문권조사。이차위기출，본문귀납출료상시공사재융자악의적12충주요표현형식，발현“상시공사재재융자계화추출전1년급고관발방거액신수”등6충행위시전형악의행위。진일보지，본문연구인위，상시공사악의재융자시재다층위탁대리관계도치기업내외치리궤제불완선적배경하，상관이익주체심조활동적“이성”선택；현유적재융자심핵감관정서대억제상시공사악의재융자행위작용유한；수연악의재융자행위대공사업적구유부면영향，단재재융자감관불도위적정황하，수단기이익유혹，상시공사잉열충우악의재융자。
In recent years, malicious refinancing of listed companies is the focus issue during the development of capital markets, however, the present corresponding researches are limited to the perspectives of the supervision, and almost there aren＇ t any researches from the perspectives of the investors. The paper made a larger scale survey to in- vestors of Chinese center four provinces, and it Aimed at getting well know the forms of malicious refinancing and their relative importance. Based on above survey, the paper concluded 12 kind of major malicious refinancing forms of listed companies, and found that there are six kinds of forms within them, such as paying huge salaries to the exec- utives within one year before issuing the refinancing plan, were the typical manifestation of malicious behaviors. Fur- ther, the paper believed that, under the circumstance of inadequate corporate governance mechanism brought out by the multi-agency relationships, malicious refinancing of listed companies is the rational choice of rent-seeking activi- ties of the main stakeholders; the present supervision and management measures had only played a limited role to constraint the malicious refinancing behavior of listed companies; although the malicious refinancing behavior has negative impact on corporate expected performance, but under the circumstance of weak refinancing supervision, tempted by the short-term interests, Chinese listed companies are still keen to perform malicious refinancing.
