中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2010年
6期
85~95
,共null页
双重公司治理环境 政治联系偏好 治理转型 行政型治理
雙重公司治理環境 政治聯繫偏好 治理轉型 行政型治理
쌍중공사치리배경 정치련계편호 치리전형 행정형치리
double corporate governance environment; political connections preference; corporate governance transition; administration governance
本文首次从双重治理环境的角度实证研究了民营企业的政治联系程度对市场绩效的双重影响,并进而探讨了治理环境对该影响的协同作用。对具有政治联系公司分样本的进一步研究发现,PC指数与其市场绩效呈现左高右低的U型不对称曲线。即一方面因初期的政治选择导致内部效率损失,另一方面又借助联系的长期比较优势制衡政府干预。同时,具有政治联系的第一大股东持股比例、经济型治理环境能弱化政治联系的负效应,而行政型治理环境能加重负效应;双重治理环境本身对公司绩效存在差异性影响。建议民营企业逐步实现由政治联系"过度偏好"向与经济型治理的"互补效应"转型。
本文首次從雙重治理環境的角度實證研究瞭民營企業的政治聯繫程度對市場績效的雙重影響,併進而探討瞭治理環境對該影響的協同作用。對具有政治聯繫公司分樣本的進一步研究髮現,PC指數與其市場績效呈現左高右低的U型不對稱麯線。即一方麵因初期的政治選擇導緻內部效率損失,另一方麵又藉助聯繫的長期比較優勢製衡政府榦預。同時,具有政治聯繫的第一大股東持股比例、經濟型治理環境能弱化政治聯繫的負效應,而行政型治理環境能加重負效應;雙重治理環境本身對公司績效存在差異性影響。建議民營企業逐步實現由政治聯繫"過度偏好"嚮與經濟型治理的"互補效應"轉型。
본문수차종쌍중치리배경적각도실증연구료민영기업적정치련계정도대시장적효적쌍중영향,병진이탐토료치리배경대해영향적협동작용。대구유정치련계공사분양본적진일보연구발현,PC지수여기시장적효정현좌고우저적U형불대칭곡선。즉일방면인초기적정치선택도치내부효솔손실,령일방면우차조련계적장기비교우세제형정부간예。동시,구유정치련계적제일대고동지고비례、경제형치리배경능약화정치련계적부효응,이행정형치리배경능가중부효응;쌍중치리배경본신대공사적효존재차이성영향。건의민영기업축보실현유정치련계"과도편호"향여경제형치리적"호보효응"전형。
This paper for the first time ever,empirically studies the double influence of political connections of private firms on market performance,from the double governance environment perspective.For the sub sample of politically connected firms,we find that the U curve between PCI and market performance.It shows that political connections have dual influence on market performance.On one hand,they could lead to the loss of internal efficiency;On the other hand,the firms could use the competitive advantages of connections to balance government intervention.Furthermore,the proportion of the first largest shareholder’ shareholding and economic governance environment could weaken the negative effect of political connections;However,the administration governance environment could aggravate the effect;The two governance environment brought double effect on firm performance.So,we suggest that the firms should accomplish the transition from the "excessive preference" for political connections to "complementary effect" with economic governance