CAJ | 학술논문

由三大集团公司主导的我国石油产业集中度高,供应链中存在明显的主导者,适合使用斯提尔伯格（Stacklberg）博弈模型对其分析。本文在综合考虑我国石油产业特点的基础上,从作为核心企业的石油开采企业和高成本高风险的勘探企业的关系入手,使用斯提尔伯格博弈模型对两者间的成本分担问题进行研究,认为供应链主导者采油商对勘探局投入资助比例取决于两者的边际利润,采油商利用手中权力处理与勘探企业的成本分担问题使供应链达到协调状态,并使自己获得最多的收益。
유삼대집단공사주도적아국석유산업집중도고,공응련중존재명현적주도자,괄합사용사제이백격（Stacklberg）박혁모형대기분석。본문재종합고필아국석유산업특점적기출상,종작위핵심기업적석유개채기업화고성본고풍험적감탐기업적관계입수,사용사제이백격박혁모형대량자간적성본분담문제진행연구,인위공응련주도자채유상대감탐국투입자조비례취결우량자적변제리윤,채유상이용수중권력처리여감탐기업적성본분담문제사공응련체도협조상태,병사자기획득최다적수익。
China＇s oil industry,leaded by the three big groups,has the characteristic of high concentration level.Because of the existence of the leaders in the supply chain,the Stackelberg Game Model is suitable for the analysis of this industry.Based on the consideration of this characteristic and started from the core oil exploitation enterprises and the high cost and high risk oil exploration enterprises,the authors analyze the problem of cost sharing with the help of Stachelberg Game Model.And it shows that the investment ratio between exploration enterprises and exploitation enterprises will be determined by the marginal profit.And the exploitation enterprises coordinate the supply chain by dealing with the problem of cost sharing with the exploration enterprises with the help of the exploitation enterprises＇ power and make themselves to gain more profit.