CAJ | 학술논문

本研究目的在于调查2002年至2004年间，中国上市公司之高管人员薪酬与自由现金流量，对于公司风险承担的影响，同时剖析两者之交互效果。此外，在进行公司规模分组后，进一步观测大小公司是否存在显著差异。实证结果显示提高高管人员薪酬确能有效降低公司风险的承担，且过多的自由现金流量及营运状况不佳的公司，会具有较高的违约风险，但藉由高管人员薪酬的增加，方可降低自由现金流量所产生的负面效果。在公司规模分组方面，上述效果仅发现存在于小规模的公司，大公司均无统计上的显著关联。对此结果，本研究亦推论此差异可归因于大规模公司具有较高的政治成本和高经济景气联动两个原因所引致。
본연구목적재우조사2002년지2004년간，중국상시공사지고관인원신수여자유현금류량，대우공사풍험승담적영향，동시부석량자지교호효과。차외，재진행공사규모분조후，진일보관측대소공사시부존재현저차이。실증결과현시제고고관인원신수학능유효강저공사풍험적승담，차과다적자유현금류량급영운상황불가적공사，회구유교고적위약풍험，단자유고관인원신수적증가，방가강저자유현금류량소산생적부면효과。재공사규모분조방면，상술효과부발현존재우소규모적공사，대공사균무통계상적현저관련。대차결과，본연구역추론차차이가귀인우대규모공사구유교고적정치성본화고경제경기련동량개원인소인치。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of manager＇ s compensation and free cash flow to risk - taking in China public offering companies over 2002 to 2004, and to analyze the interactive effects. In addition, we further examine whether the size effect has a significantly difference after separating firm size into large and small sub - sample. The empirical results present that the increasing the manager＇ s compensation can effectively reduce the risk - taking for firm, and the firm of higher free cash flow as well as bad performance will hold the highly default risk. However, the negative influence from free cash flow can be offset by increasing manager＇ s compensation. In the sub - samples, these outcomes are only found in the group of small size but not in the group of large size. Regarding the results this paper infer that the reason may contribute to the effects of both higher political cost or higher economic environment in large firms.