CAJ | 학술논문

隧道行为虽然合理地解释了金字塔结构下控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突，但对重复博弈条件下中小股东明知道利益受到侵害却依旧投资金字塔结构公司的激励动因的解释力度不足。受到LLSV掏空模型的启发，笔者构建了一个数理模型，考察在股权相对集中条件下控制性股东持股比例、控制权与现金流权偏离度、法律保护程度、惩罚力度四个因素对隧道行为的影响。模型表明，两权偏离度与隧道行为正向变动；法律保护、惩罚力度与隧道行为反向变动；持股比例对隧道行为不是简单的线性关系，较高的持股比例增强了侵占动机，当持股比例达到一定程度后则产生支撑效应。
수도행위수연합리지해석료금자탑결구하공고고동여중소고동지간적이익충돌，단대중복박혁조건하중소고동명지도이익수도침해각의구투자금자탑결구공사적격려동인적해석력도불족。수도LLSV도공모형적계발，필자구건료일개수리모형，고찰재고권상대집중조건하공제성고동지고비례、공제권여현금류권편리도、법률보호정도、징벌력도사개인소대수도행위적영향。모형표명，량권편리도여수도행위정향변동；법률보호、징벌력도여수도행위반향변동；지고비례대수도행위불시간단적선성관계，교고적지고비례증강료침점동궤，당지고비례체도일정정도후칙산생지탱효응。
Although tunneling reasonably explains the interest conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders under pyramid structure. Given that the tunneling is known under the repeated games, it can not sufficiently explain the reason why minority shareholders still have the incentive to invest. Enlightened by the tunneling model of LLSV, the authors develop a mathematical model that examines the impact of share percentage of ultimate controlling shareholders, deviation of control right and cash flow right, legal protection extent and punitive severity on tunneling. This model shows that the deviation of the two rights is positively related to tunneling; the relationship between share -holding percentage and tunneling is not simply linear. The higher share -holding proportion strengthens the motive to occupy. When the percentage of share - holding reaches a certain extent, the support effect will result.