财经理论与实践
財經理論與實踐
재경이론여실천
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
2010年
4期
43~47
,共null页
高管薪酬 现金股利 会计盈余质量 公司规模 股权制衡
高管薪酬 現金股利 會計盈餘質量 公司規模 股權製衡
고관신수 현금고리 회계영여질량 공사규모 고권제형
Executive Compensation; Cash Dividend; Quality of Accounting Earnings; Company Size; Counter-balance towards the Largest Shareholder
利用2007年我国国有控股公司数据,以中小股东利益保护为因变量,以高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费为主要考察对象,并选取公司规模和股权制衡结构作为控制变量,检验在不同激励方式下高管薪酬与中小股东利益的相关性,结论表明：国有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于现金薪酬和在职消费,对中小股东利益侵害较大,而高管持股则可以保护中小投资者利益。
利用2007年我國國有控股公司數據,以中小股東利益保護為因變量,以高管現金薪酬、高管持股比例和在職消費為主要攷察對象,併選取公司規模和股權製衡結構作為控製變量,檢驗在不同激勵方式下高管薪酬與中小股東利益的相關性,結論錶明：國有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于現金薪酬和在職消費,對中小股東利益侵害較大,而高管持股則可以保護中小投資者利益。
이용2007년아국국유공고공사수거,이중소고동이익보호위인변량,이고관현금신수、고관지고비례화재직소비위주요고찰대상,병선취공사규모화고권제형결구작위공제변량,검험재불동격려방식하고관신수여중소고동이익적상관성,결론표명：국유공고공사고관신수주요집중우현금신수화재직소비,대중소고동이익침해교대,이고관지고칙가이보호중소투자자이익。
This paper defines minority investor protection as dependent variable,while cash salary,the proportion of holdings and non-pecuniary compensation of executives as investigative objects,and selects company size and counter-balance towards the largest shareholder as control variables.Using the year 2007 data of state-owned listed company,we test the relationship between the executive compensation and interests of minority investors in different incentives.The results show that executive compensation of state-owned listed companies focuses on cash salary and non-pecuniary compensation.Therefore they will violate the interests of minority investors,while the proportion of holdings can help to protect minority investors.
