CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2001-2005年直接IPO上市的A股民营上市公司样本为研究对象，研究政治关系对控股股东利益输送和公司绩效的影响。研究结果发现，政治关系公司控股股东的利益输送程度高于非政治关系公司，而且这种效应在金融发展落后的区域更加明显，总体而言，政治关系对公司绩效的影响较弱。在不存在控股股东资金占用的情况下，政治关系能改善企业绩效；但是，在控股股东资金占用的情况下，政治关系对公司绩效的影响不显著。上述研究结果表明，民营上市公司建立政治关系不仅出于政治资本投资的需要，而且是控股股东利益输送的需要。本文的政策含义是：大力推进我国银行市场化改革，减轻政府官员对银行信贷决策的影响。以改善民营企业的治理结构，促进我国金融市场发展和经济增长。
본문이2001-2005년직접IPO상시적A고민영상시공사양본위연구대상，연구정치관계대공고고동이익수송화공사적효적영향。연구결과발현，정치관계공사공고고동적이익수송정도고우비정치관계공사，이차저충효응재금융발전락후적구역경가명현，총체이언，정치관계대공사적효적영향교약。재불존재공고고동자금점용적정황하，정치관계능개선기업적효；단시，재공고고동자금점용적정황하，정치관계대공사적효적영향불현저。상술연구결과표명，민영상시공사건립정치관계불부출우정치자본투자적수요，이차시공고고동이익수송적수요。본문적정책함의시：대력추진아국은행시장화개혁，감경정부관원대은행신대결책적영향。이개선민영기업적치리결구，촉진아국금융시장발전화경제증장。
Using the privately-owned firms listed with initial public offering from 2002 to 2005 in China＇s emerging markets, we examine the impact of political connections on the expropriation of minority shareholders. We find that controlling shareholders in politically-connected firms are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders, and the difference between connected and unconnected firms becomes particularly pronounced when politically- connected firms operate in the regions with less developed banking markets. These results suggest that political connections are an investment in expropriation of minority shareholders, which is called the agency view of political connections, because political connections can mitigate the expropriation costs for controlling shareholders via the influence of government on financial institutions. Under the agency view, political connections are symptomatic of an agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders which is costly to firm performance. Under political capital investment view suggested by the extant literature, political connections are an investment in political capital that should, in expectation, generate political benefits, such as preferential access to bank financing, which is beneficial to firm performance. In order to verify both views, we examine the influence of political connections on firm performance. We find that political connections have significantly positive impacts on firm performance in the sub-sample with less expropriation of minority shareholders where the fund occupation by controlling shareholders is zero, while have insignificant impacts on firm performance in the full sample and the sub-sample with fund occupation. These provide additional evidence for the agency view of political connections in addition to the political capital investment view, and imply that political connections improve firm performance only in the firms with less expropriation of minority shareholders. The policy implication of our paper is that the banking market should be reformed substantially and be less influenced by bureaucrats in order to improve the corporate governance of privately-owned firms and speed up the financial markets and economic growth.