CAJ | 학술논문

公司治理机制的效度不仅应该体现在提高公司业绩水平上，更应该体现在稳定公司业绩风险的作用上。本文选取2004-2008年深交所上市的374家上市公司为研究样本，以公司业绩的波动性分析为切入点，分析CEO权力强度、信息披露质量对公司横向和纵向业绩波动性的影响。研究发现：（1）CEO权力强度越大，公司的经营业绩越高但公司经营业绩的风险也越大，表明赋予CEO更多的决策权力是一把“双刃剑”；（2）信息披露质量的提高能有效降低公司业绩的波动性，并且信息披露质量越高，越能有效降低CEO权力强度加大的经营风险；（3）通过对不同股权性质企业的分析，发现国有企业CEO的权力强度对公司业绩波动性的影响显著地高于非国有企业CEO权力强度对公司业绩波动性的影响。信息披露质量对于CEO权力强度下公司经营风险的抑制效应在国有企业表现得更为明显。
공사치리궤제적효도불부응해체현재제고공사업적수평상，경응해체현재은정공사업적풍험적작용상。본문선취2004-2008년심교소상시적374가상시공사위연구양본，이공사업적적파동성분석위절입점，분석CEO권력강도、신식피로질량대공사횡향화종향업적파동성적영향。연구발현：（1）CEO권력강도월대，공사적경영업적월고단공사경영업적적풍험야월대，표명부여CEO경다적결책권력시일파“쌍인검”；（2）신식피로질량적제고능유효강저공사업적적파동성，병차신식피로질량월고，월능유효강저CEO권력강도가대적경영풍험；（3）통과대불동고권성질기업적분석，발현국유기업CEO적권력강도대공사업적파동성적영향현저지고우비국유기업CEO권력강도대공사업적파동성적영향。신식피로질량대우CEO권력강도하공사경영풍험적억제효응재국유기업표현득경위명현。
The validity of corporate governance should be reflected not only by improving corporate performance, but also by stabilizing the variability of corporate performance. In this paper, we argue that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test two key hypotheses about：（1） how CEO power to influence decisions will affect firm performance variability; （2） whether the effect of CEO power on corporate performance variability has been affected by corporate environment, especially by information disclosure quality. Based on the sample data of SZSE＇s listed companies from 2004 to 2008, this paper empirically tests the relations between CEO power, information disclosure quality and corporate performance variability. The research results show：（1） CEO power is positively associated with corporate performance（measured by ROA and Tobin＇s Q） and corporate performance variability, it indicates CEO power is a double-edged sword. （2） Corporate performance variability is significantly affected by information disclosure quality of the listed companies. And the effect of CEO power on corporate performance variability has been reduced by improving information disclosure quality. （3） by analyzing ownership characteristic of listed corporate, this paper finds that the effect of CEO power on corporate performance variability in the state owned firms is higher than that of in the non-state owned firms and the effect that CEO power＇ role on corporate performance variability has been reduced by improving information disclosure quality is stronger in the state owned firms than that of in the non-state owned firms. To sum up, the results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability, and to concerns about the endogeneity of CEO power. Thus, more powerful CEOs appear to have a greater impact on corporate decision-making, producing greater variability in the realized outcomes of these decisions and the effect of CEO power on corporate performance variability has been weakened by information disclosure quality of the listed companies.