CAJ | 학술논문

本文建立了政策执行的双重激励模型,探索政治激励、经济激励与地方政府政策执行方式的相互关系。通过考察新能源汽车产业政策在地方层面的执行情况,笔者发现,地方政府执行中央政府产业政策的实质动机是经济激励。由于新兴产业的市场回报无法现时兑现,且其发展前景与本地的资源禀赋情况密切相关,因此对地方政府的经济激励呈现很大的不确定性和差异性。地方政府故而在平衡经济发展和政治晋升的情况下作出实动、暗动、伪动、缓动等不同选择。本文进一步提出了新兴产业政策制定和执行的启示。
본문건립료정책집행적쌍중격려모형,탐색정치격려、경제격려여지방정부정책집행방식적상호관계。통과고찰신능원기차산업정책재지방층면적집행정황,필자발현,지방정부집행중앙정부산업정책적실질동궤시경제격려。유우신흥산업적시장회보무법현시태현,차기발전전경여본지적자원품부정황밀절상관,인차대지방정부적경제격려정현흔대적불학정성화차이성。지방정부고이재평형경제발전화정치진승적정황하작출실동、암동、위동、완동등불동선택。본문진일보제출료신흥산업정책제정화집행적계시。
This paper builds a Dual Incentive Model of industrial policy implementation in China to explore the patterns of local policy implementation under political and financial incentives.The authors select the new energy automobile industry as the case for study.According to the investigation of policy implementation at the local level,the authors find that the motivation of local governments to carry out central government＇s industrial policy mainly comes from developing local economy.Because the benefits of new industry cannot be realized in a short time and is largely dependent on local resource endowment,the level of local financial incentives vary by locality and is highly uncertain.Consequently,local government officials choose very different strategies in responding to the actions of the central government.Implications are drawn from the analysis with regard to formulating and implementing policies for emerging industries.