天津商业大学学报
天津商業大學學報
천진상업대학학보
Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce
2010年
5期
37~39
,共null页
理性 公共知识 集体理性 个体理性
理性 公共知識 集體理性 箇體理性
이성 공공지식 집체이성 개체이성
rationality; common knowledge; collective rationality; individual rationality
“理性人”和公共知识是博弈论中的两个公设,即假设博弈局中人都是理性的,在公共知识的背景下选取行为策略,使自己的效用达到最大化。然而,正是从这样的假设前提出发,却使博弈理性推理陷入困境,“理性人”不理性。因此,符合逻辑的是对博弈论公设产生质疑。
“理性人”和公共知識是博弈論中的兩箇公設,即假設博弈跼中人都是理性的,在公共知識的揹景下選取行為策略,使自己的效用達到最大化。然而,正是從這樣的假設前提齣髮,卻使博弈理性推理陷入睏境,“理性人”不理性。因此,符閤邏輯的是對博弈論公設產生質疑。
“이성인”화공공지식시박혁론중적량개공설,즉가설박혁국중인도시이성적,재공공지식적배경하선취행위책략,사자기적효용체도최대화。연이,정시종저양적가설전제출발,각사박혁이성추리함입곤경,“이성인”불이성。인차,부합라집적시대박혁론공설산생질의。
"Rational agent" and common knowledge are two public pre-assumptions in game theory, which assume that players in game are rational, and choose action strategy against a background of common knowledge to maximize utility. However, it consequentially puts rational reasoning in a dilemma, and "rational agent" is reasonless. Logically, what we can do is to throw doubt on public pre-assumptions in game theory.