华东经济管理
華東經濟管理
화동경제관리
East China Economic Management
2010年
10期
126~130
,共null页
渠道 进化博弈 合作
渠道 進化博弈 閤作
거도 진화박혁 합작
channel; evolutionary game; cooperation
文章研究了由制造商和零售商组成的简单分销渠道,采用博弈最新发展的进化博弈理论,分析了制造商和零售商的决策问题。研究表明在完全理性下通过讨价还价来分配合作总利润,不会实现帕累托最优策略——合作,并且根据分配比例的不同范围可以得到不同的博弈类型;在有限理性下制造商和零售商通过长期反复博弈,学习和调整,渠道合作的可能性与超额利润成正比;当超额利润趋近无穷时,制造商和零售商完全合作。如果制造商(或零售商)合作,零售商(或制造商)不合作,制造商(或零售商)合作的损失越小,渠道关系趋近合作的可能性越大;渠道合作的可能性与各自的贴现因子成正比。
文章研究瞭由製造商和零售商組成的簡單分銷渠道,採用博弈最新髮展的進化博弈理論,分析瞭製造商和零售商的決策問題。研究錶明在完全理性下通過討價還價來分配閤作總利潤,不會實現帕纍託最優策略——閤作,併且根據分配比例的不同範圍可以得到不同的博弈類型;在有限理性下製造商和零售商通過長期反複博弈,學習和調整,渠道閤作的可能性與超額利潤成正比;噹超額利潤趨近無窮時,製造商和零售商完全閤作。如果製造商(或零售商)閤作,零售商(或製造商)不閤作,製造商(或零售商)閤作的損失越小,渠道關繫趨近閤作的可能性越大;渠道閤作的可能性與各自的貼現因子成正比。
문장연구료유제조상화령수상조성적간단분소거도,채용박혁최신발전적진화박혁이론,분석료제조상화령수상적결책문제。연구표명재완전이성하통과토개환개래분배합작총리윤,불회실현파루탁최우책략——합작,병차근거분배비례적불동범위가이득도불동적박혁류형;재유한이성하제조상화령수상통과장기반복박혁,학습화조정,거도합작적가능성여초액리윤성정비;당초액리윤추근무궁시,제조상화령수상완전합작。여과제조상(혹령수상)합작,령수상(혹제조상)불합작,제조상(혹령수상)합작적손실월소,거도관계추근합작적가능성월대;거도합작적가능성여각자적첩현인자성정비。
In this paper,simple distribution channel was constituted of manufacture and retailer,channel game model were constructed.The evolutionary game of the latest development game was adopted,the decision-making of the manufacturers and retailers were studied.Research shows that allocation profits of the cooperation through bargaining under fully rational can not achieve Pareto optimal strategy-cooperation,and based on the ratio between the different areas can be a different type of game;Under the limited rational manufacturers and retailers through long-term repeated game,learning and adjustment,Study shows that: the possibility of channel cooperation in direct proportion with the excess profits;when the excess profits approach infinity,the manufacturers and retailers to cooperate fully.If the manufacturer(or retailer) cooperation,but retailers(or manufacturers) non-cooperation,the loss of manufacturers(or retailers) was the smaller,the possibility of approaching cooperation was the greater;and possibilities of channels cooperation in direct proportion to their respective discount factor.