CAJ | 학술논문

通过对本阶段上市公司管理层股权激励方案的统计发现，中国目前的激励方案存在等待期偏短，行权约束条件较为单一等问题，这将损害投资者的利益。对样本公司股权结构的统计发现，进行股权激励的公司具有机构投资者持股比例较高等与理论相矛盾的特征。而对样本公司盈利能力的统计则发现。目前进行股权激励的上市公司具有盈利能力较好。但股东收益能力较低，并且股价相对较低，据此确定的股票期权行权价也会相对较低的特征，总体上有利于管理层的利益。
통과대본계단상시공사관리층고권격려방안적통계발현，중국목전적격려방안존재등대기편단，행권약속조건교위단일등문제，저장손해투자자적이익。대양본공사고권결구적통계발현，진행고권격려적공사구유궤구투자자지고비례교고등여이론상모순적특정。이대양본공사영리능력적통계칙발현。목전진행고권격려적상시공사구유영리능력교호。단고동수익능력교저，병차고개상대교저，거차학정적고표기권행권개야회상대교저적특정，총체상유리우관리층적이익。
Through relevant statistics of the present managerial equity incentive plans in listed companies, we found that there were some problems existed in share incentive plan in China, such as the vesting period was short, exercise constraint condition was single, and so on. To some degree, these problems may damage the interests of the investors. We also found that companies carried on managerial equity incentives have high percent of share by institutional investors, which is contradicted with theory. By profitability analysis, we can conclude that the sample companies have high earnings of itself, low profitability for its shareholders and low share price, which can all benefit present managers.