金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2010年
10期
83~102
,共null页
企业集团 银行贷款 担保 资金配置效率
企業集糰 銀行貸款 擔保 資金配置效率
기업집단 은행대관 담보 자금배치효솔
business group, bank loans, guarantee, capital allocation efficiency
本文以1999—2005年深沪所有由独立公司变为集团成员公司的数据为样本,运用Heckman样本选择模型,研究集团化对公司银行贷款和资金配置效率的影响。结果发现,集团化能提高公司获得银行贷款担保的概率,可以帮助公司获得更多的银行贷款和更长的贷款期限。进一步的检验发现,集团化会导致公司的过度投资行为。这些研究结果表明,集团化能降低银行贷款的风险,进而增加公司的银行融资便利;控股股东会利用集团化公司的银行融资便利,进行过度投资以最大化自己的控制权私有收益,从而降低银行信贷资金的配置效率。就银监会的信贷政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,银监会有关单一企业和单一集团的差别贷款政策尽管可以降低银行贷款的风险,但同时也会降低银行信贷资金的配置效率,并可能会对单一企业的信贷资金产生挤出效应。
本文以1999—2005年深滬所有由獨立公司變為集糰成員公司的數據為樣本,運用Heckman樣本選擇模型,研究集糰化對公司銀行貸款和資金配置效率的影響。結果髮現,集糰化能提高公司穫得銀行貸款擔保的概率,可以幫助公司穫得更多的銀行貸款和更長的貸款期限。進一步的檢驗髮現,集糰化會導緻公司的過度投資行為。這些研究結果錶明,集糰化能降低銀行貸款的風險,進而增加公司的銀行融資便利;控股股東會利用集糰化公司的銀行融資便利,進行過度投資以最大化自己的控製權私有收益,從而降低銀行信貸資金的配置效率。就銀鑑會的信貸政策而言,本文的研究結果意味著,銀鑑會有關單一企業和單一集糰的差彆貸款政策儘管可以降低銀行貸款的風險,但同時也會降低銀行信貸資金的配置效率,併可能會對單一企業的信貸資金產生擠齣效應。
본문이1999—2005년심호소유유독립공사변위집단성원공사적수거위양본,운용Heckman양본선택모형,연구집단화대공사은행대관화자금배치효솔적영향。결과발현,집단화능제고공사획득은행대관담보적개솔,가이방조공사획득경다적은행대관화경장적대관기한。진일보적검험발현,집단화회도치공사적과도투자행위。저사연구결과표명,집단화능강저은행대관적풍험,진이증가공사적은행융자편리;공고고동회이용집단화공사적은행융자편리,진행과도투자이최대화자기적공제권사유수익,종이강저은행신대자금적배치효솔。취은감회적신대정책이언,본문적연구결과의미착,은감회유관단일기업화단일집단적차별대관정책진관가이강저은행대관적풍험,단동시야회강저은행신대자금적배치효솔,병가능회대단일기업적신대자금산생제출효응。
This paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on corporate bank loans and capital allocation efficiency based on the dataset transforming from independent firms to business group affiliations from 1999 to 2005 and the Heckman's sample selection model. It is found that compared with those independent firms, business group affiliations are more likely to get the guarantee of bank loan and more and long-term bank loans. Moreover, business group affiliations are more likely to over-invest. These results indicate that the intra-group propping reduces the risk of bank loans, and thus bring preferential bank loans to business group affiliations; the controlling shareholder, in order to increase the private benefit of control, will require the business group affiliations with access to bank loans to over-invest, and subsequently decrease the capital allocation efficiency of bank loans. As to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the results suggest that the discriminative bank loans policy for the independent firms can reduce the risk of bank loans, but will decrease the capital allocation efficiency that may make it harder for independent firms to raise bank loans.