经济研究
經濟研究
경제연구
Economic Research Journal
2010年
11期
73~87
,共null页
管理层权力 国有企业 私有收益 操纵性薪酬
管理層權力 國有企業 私有收益 操縱性薪酬
관리층권력 국유기업 사유수익 조종성신수
Managerial Power; State-owned Enterprises; Private Income; Rigging Compensation
全球金融危机爆发以来，我国国有企业高管“天价薪酬”与“零薪酬”并存的乱象，引起社会公众的广泛关注。本文针对国企高管薪酬改革的制度背景，选取2004—2007年国有上市公司为样本，研究我国国企高管是否通过其权力影响而获取私有收益，并探讨其进行薪酬操纵的行为策略和薪酬结构的价值效应。研究发现：（1）国有企业高管的权力越大，其获取的私有收益越高，但中央政府控制的国有企业高管偏好隐性的非货币性私有收益，而地方政府控制的国有企业高管更偏好显性的货币性私有收益；（2）从薪酬业绩敏感性来看，管理层权力越大，薪酬与操纵性业绩之间的敏感性越大，表明随着权力增长，管理层会倾向利用盈余操纵获取绩效薪酬；（3）通过对实际薪酬的分解，发现激励薪酬具有正面的价值效应，而操纵性薪酬具有负面的价值效应。研究还发现，拓宽高管激励渠道，转变控制策略的内部治理机制以及聘请高质量审计服务、提高机构持股比例的外部监管机制可以有效抑制国企高管的薪酬操纵行为。
全毬金融危機爆髮以來，我國國有企業高管“天價薪酬”與“零薪酬”併存的亂象，引起社會公衆的廣汎關註。本文針對國企高管薪酬改革的製度揹景，選取2004—2007年國有上市公司為樣本，研究我國國企高管是否通過其權力影響而穫取私有收益，併探討其進行薪酬操縱的行為策略和薪酬結構的價值效應。研究髮現：（1）國有企業高管的權力越大，其穫取的私有收益越高，但中央政府控製的國有企業高管偏好隱性的非貨幣性私有收益，而地方政府控製的國有企業高管更偏好顯性的貨幣性私有收益；（2）從薪酬業績敏感性來看，管理層權力越大，薪酬與操縱性業績之間的敏感性越大，錶明隨著權力增長，管理層會傾嚮利用盈餘操縱穫取績效薪酬；（3）通過對實際薪酬的分解，髮現激勵薪酬具有正麵的價值效應，而操縱性薪酬具有負麵的價值效應。研究還髮現，拓寬高管激勵渠道，轉變控製策略的內部治理機製以及聘請高質量審計服務、提高機構持股比例的外部鑑管機製可以有效抑製國企高管的薪酬操縱行為。
전구금융위궤폭발이래，아국국유기업고관“천개신수”여“령신수”병존적난상，인기사회공음적엄범관주。본문침대국기고관신수개혁적제도배경，선취2004—2007년국유상시공사위양본，연구아국국기고관시부통과기권력영향이획취사유수익，병탐토기진행신수조종적행위책략화신수결구적개치효응。연구발현：（1）국유기업고관적권력월대，기획취적사유수익월고，단중앙정부공제적국유기업고관편호은성적비화폐성사유수익，이지방정부공제적국유기업고관경편호현성적화폐성사유수익；（2）종신수업적민감성래간，관리층권력월대，신수여조종성업적지간적민감성월대，표명수착권력증장，관리층회경향이용영여조종획취적효신수；（3）통과대실제신수적분해，발현격려신수구유정면적개치효응，이조종성신수구유부면적개치효응。연구환발현，탁관고관격려거도，전변공제책략적내부치리궤제이급빙청고질량심계복무、제고궤구지고비례적외부감관궤제가이유효억제국기고관적신수조종행위。
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the debate about coexistence of ＂astronomical salaries＂ and ＂zero pay＂ in China＇s state-owned enterprises has led to a wide public concern. Based on the background of state-owned enterprises reform, by selecting the data of state-owned enterprises from 2004 to 2007, this paper studies the compensation rigging behavior of top managers of the state-owned enterprises and their value effect. We find that： （ 1 ） More managerial power of top managers of state- owned enterprises leads to higher private benefits, the top managers of state-owned enterprise controlled by the central government prefer to hidden non-monetary private benefits, while the top managers controlled by local governments prefer to explicit monetary private benefits. （2） From the pay performance sensitivity point of view, the greater power of top managers, the higher sensitivity between pay and rigging performance. This indicates that top managers with stronger power tend to use earning rigging to entrench performance compensation. （3） Through the decomposition of the actual salary, we find that incentive compensation has significant positive value effect, but rigging compensation has significant negative value effect. Finally, this paper also examines the role of internal and external of governance mechanisms, we find the compensation rigging problem could be suppressed by multi-incentive channel, matrix control strategy, higher quality audit service and higher institutional investor ownership.
