CAJ | 학술논문

对国有企业的薪酬管制不仅是一个公平问题，更是一个效率问题，其内在经济机理是国有企业在特定治理环境下降低代理成本的一种制度安排。对于垄断性的国有企业，由于企业的绩效在很大程度上受政策性因素影响，难以准确地反映企业管理者的经营能力，激励性的薪酬制度容易导致经营者过多地攫取制度性红利，从而损害国有企业的价值，对其经营者的薪酬限制是为了限制管理者获得制度性红利、降低代理成本。美、法、德等国家的经验显示，在对垄断性国有企业实行薪酬管制的同时需要加强对企业管理者行为的监督与约束。作为中国新一轮企业工资制度改革的重点，对国有企业的薪酬限制应该避免一刀切，对不同类型的国有企业进行分类治理；同时，健全国有企业审计制度，加强对企业管理者行为的外部约束。
대국유기업적신수관제불부시일개공평문제，경시일개효솔문제，기내재경제궤리시국유기업재특정치리배경하강저대리성본적일충제도안배。대우롱단성적국유기업，유우기업적적효재흔대정도상수정책성인소영향，난이준학지반영기업관리자적경영능력，격려성적신수제도용역도치경영자과다지확취제도성홍리，종이손해국유기업적개치，대기경영자적신수한제시위료한제관리자획득제도성홍리、강저대리성본。미、법、덕등국가적경험현시，재대롱단성국유기업실행신수관제적동시수요가강대기업관리자행위적감독여약속。작위중국신일륜기업공자제도개혁적중점，대국유기업적신수한제응해피면일도절，대불동류형적국유기업진행분류치리；동시，건전국유기업심계제도，가강대기업관리자행위적외부약속。
The salary regulation on managers of SOEs is a problem of efficiency rather than equity, and it＇s an institutional arrangement to reduce agent cost under special governance environment. Especially, the institutional dividends of monopolistic SOEs should be controlled by implementing salary regulation because the performances of them are often decided by policies. According to the experiences of foreign countries, government should enhance constraints on managers while implementing salary regulation. Some policies on China＇s SOEs governance are advanced according the theoretical analysis and international experience.